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Preface 
This Master Thesis is original, unpublished, independent work by the author, Richard Stiller. 
 
Abstract 
Coffee has been traded for over a century and producing countries have not been able to 
upgrade in the global value chain. This thesis explores reasons why this has been the case and 
shows existing opportunities for producing countries. The core of the thesis is the 
presentation, analysis and discussion of five different value chains. These are Conventional 
Trade, Fair Trade, Direct Trade, Direct Trade of Roasted Coffee and the exceptional case of 
Juan Valdez Coffee Shops. I will show that all lead firms, except for the Juan Valdez case, are 
based in consuming countries. Furthermore I conclude that though Fair Trade and Direct 
Trade fulfill their promises, they are not able to build up a basis for further development of 
actors in producing countries. This is the case because actors in producing countries are not 
able and have few possibilities to functionally upgrade except for the cases of Direct Trade of 
Roasted Coffee and Juan Valdez case. 
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Chapter 1 | Introduction 
Coffee is one of the most traded commodities in the world. Therefore, coffee occupies an important 
position in global trade, not only for producing countries but also for consuming countries (Fischer 
& Bart 2014: 162). Coffee production takes place in the ‘Bean Belt’ between the Tropics of Cancer 
and Capricorn where the top coffee-producing-nations (by volume) are located. The top four 
producers are: (1) Brazil, (2) Vietnam, (3) Indonesia, and (4) Colombia. Together they produced 
96.67 million 60kg-bags of coffee, which was about 60% of overall global production in the 
2012/13 season (German Coffee Association 2015).  
The trading of coffee, however, has appeared in different forms, especially on an international. The 
first alternative form of trade, Fair Trade, emerged out of socially-responsible consumerism, as 
falling coffee prices endangered the livelihoods of millions of coffee farmers around the world. 
Then, Direct Trade entered the stage and put the focus of coffee trade on specialty coffee 
distinguished by origin, taste, and quality (Fischer & Bart: 162). In the last decade a new form of 
trade was born where the emphasis is on more production steps in the producing countries. This 
form is termed Direct Trade of Roasted Coffee as it also inherits characteristics of Direct Trade. 
Although these different forms brought new characteristics into the coffee trade, the basic dilemma 
was and still is the same: coffee-producing countries are primarily relegated to the position of green 
bean supplier whereas companies in consuming countries are responsible for the further processing; 
especially the marketing and branding of coffee beans. 
This dilemma can be better understood in the graph below. Here, the top ten coffee-producing 
nations are displayed along with the main coffee-consuming countries. As one can see, coffee 
production is dominated by the top 4 producing nations listed earlier, and consumption takes largely 
place in the United States, Brazil and Europe. The only two countries that are consuming a 
significant proportion of their own production are Ethiopia (55 percent in 2012/13) and Brazil (40 
percent in 2012/13) (German Coffee Association 2015). This underlines the basic dilemma in the 
coffee trade: coffee-producing countries are mainly developing countries such as Ethiopia, whereas 
consumption takes place mostly in developed countries; mainly the USA and Europe. This situation 
could have created some opportunity for developing countries to export roasted coffee, however, 
producing nations have always been green bean suppliers for companies based in consuming 
nations. This means that demand is mostly generated in a distant market by consumers who have no 
relation to the farmers. On the other hand, farmers do not know what consumers expect and are 
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therefore unable modify and control production to match a distant and poorly understood market. 
These are the reasons why market access in consuming countries through marketing, branding and 
advertising is one of the key elements of coffee trade.  
Global Top Coffee-Producing and Consuming Nations in 2012/2013 
 
Figure 1: Global Top Coffee-Producing and Consuming Nations in 2012/2013 (German Coffee Association 2015); 
dark brown = production; light brown = consumption 
 
Out of this dilemma and the shown situation for many coffee-producing countries, I came up with 
the research question for my thesis. However, I am also drawing on research I have conducted in 
the topic before. I present the main topics and findings of two research projects I have carried out in 
the coffee sector below.  
Project one: Together with Éamonn McCay and Aneli Soomre, I compared the Global Value 
Chains of Conventional Trade, Fair Trade, and Direct Trade. Direct Trade is a relatively new form 
of trade for small high-quality roasters, where they have direct relationships with the farmers. 
Farmers do not capture more value when participating in Direct Trade instead of Fair Trade, but 
they do capture more value of the final product than in Conventional Trade. For this project, data 
was gathered by interviews with three different Direct Trade firms in 2013. Two of them were 
selected from Denmark and one from Berlin, Germany. Through the gathering of primary data the 
authors were able to describe, analyze and discuss Direct Trade as previously unprecedented within 
academia. I rely on the gathered data for my thesis as well, however, it will be used in a different 
context and therefore contribute to expansion of this research. 
Project two: Éamonn McCay and I were assessing three different types of support for people 
involved in the coffee business with a focus on farmers, in three developing countries: public 
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support (Uganda), private support (Ethiopia), and public-private-partnership (Rwanda). The main 
aim of the project was to compare different projects that support coffee farmers to enhance their 
livelihood through different approaches. This project relied on secondary data. We found that 
support via private and private-public partnership had the biggest effect, especially when either 
creating relationships between farmers and re-sellers in consumer countries or a direct possibility 
for the farmer to sell the coffee in a long-term relationship, thereby creating better market access 
through long-term relationships.  
These two projects can be seen as a starting point for this thesis. However, the focus of both the 
projects described above was on farmers. Though many projects have been carried out, only a few 
examples of upgrading and none of functional upgrading could be found. From this the research 
question of this thesis emerged: 
What value do producing countries capture in the global coffee value chain and why?  
In this thesis I attempt not only to show the reasons why coffee-producing countries have been 
confined to the position of green bean supplier to international corporations for over a century, but 
additionally why actors from producing countries have not been able to (functionally) upgrade in 
the global coffee value chain. Finally, I will show how actors upgrade in the value chain and 
therefore improve not only their position, but also the governance structure of the global value chain 
in their favor and finally their income. To answer this research question, the question is split into 
two components: (1) Why do actors in producing countries not capture more value?; and (2) How 
could they capture more value and therefore improve their position in the global coffee value chain? 
Much of the relevant literature has focused on the part farmers take in the global coffee trade and 
how their situation could be improved by alternative trading forms. I argue instead that the focus 
should be laid on the overall value captured by producing countries as this will lead to (functional) 
upgrading and a better position of coffee-producing actors in the value chain. Finally an improved 
position for the coffee sector in producing countries will lead to more value captured and higher 
incomes, and therefore, to more jobs and sustainable development. 
First and foremost, it has to be recognized by the reader that the cases chosen for this thesis to 
answer the research questions are niches of the coffee market in consuming countries. The most 
important independent labels UTZ Kapeh, Fair Trade, Rainforest Alliance and Organic amount 
together for approximately 4 percent of global coffee sales (Kolk 2013: 329). An estimated 
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maximum of 10 percent of coffee trade are group under ‘specialty coffee’ (Fischer & Bart 2014: 
164), leaving the remaining 86 percent to conventional trade.  
I use the Global Value Chain (GVC) approach to address the research question of the thesis. This 
approach helps to identify lead firms and the corresponding power structures within the GVCs. 
Throughout the thesis the concepts barriers to entry and upgrading plays a fundamental role, as 
they are the key elements for actors in producing countries to be able to capture more value in the 
global coffee trade. Here, the GVC approach is especially helpful as it shows power relations and 
shares of value taken in a whole product cycle. Additionally, the approach allows comparative 
conclusions to be drawn on the findings. 
The thesis compares four value chains with the focus on the overall coffee sector and the value 
captured in the producing country: (1) Conventional Trade, (2) Fair Trade, (3) Direct Trade, and (4) 
Direct Trade of Roasted Coffee. The different value chains will be described, and analyzed. 
Conventionally traded coffee still constitutes for vast majority of global trade and therefore sets the 
reference point for other trading forms. Fair Trade is the oldest alternative trading form of coffee 
that exists in the sector; therefore it is interesting to look at representing the first alternative to 
'conventional trade'. For these two trade systems I rely on already existing literature which can be 
seen as reliable and valid as they are either books reviewed by others or peer-reviewed articles from 
journals. For further reliability and objectivity, I use varying sources with different perspectives.  
Direct Trade focuses primarily on the quality and origin, which coffee farmers can take into 
consideration, in order to transform their coffee to a differentiated product and capture more value 
through this process. So, in the last two chains producing countries attempt to capture more value in 
the value adding process. I relied on data gathered by the research project on Direct Trade in 2013. 
The data is also valid for this project as the main aim was to describe and analyze the GVC of 
Direct Trade. However, I conducted only one out of three interviews. For the others I relied on my 
colleagues with whom I researched the topic and developed the questionnaire. Therefore I am able 
to rely on the data gathered for Direct Trade. However, a higher validity could be reached by 
interviewing more than one person from each company and by gathering more data in total. I 
suggest more research on this topic to gather more data and therefore gain reliability.      
The last case of Direct Trade of Roasted Coffee illustrates a value chain where coffee is further 
processed in the producing country and therefore actors in producing countries were able to 
functionally upgrade in the GVC. However, the companies operating in the sphere of Direct Trade 
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and Direct Trade of Roasted Coffee are respectively small and sometimes even ‘one-person’ 
companies. The only full-time employee is the CEO and founder of the company. I conducted 
interviews with the CEOs of two companies. This is especially important as the CEO has the full 
overview of the companies, including financial data and is able to answer all questions. The 
negative side is that I had to rely on one interview and was not able to carry out more interviews in 
the same company to verify statements by the CEO; leading to a lower validity. The research should 
be supported by further data gathering and more research. The interviews can be seen as exploratory 
case studies as Direct Trade and Direct Trade of Roasted coffee have not been thoroughly 
researched by the academic world. Both times the interviews were semi-structured to leave room 
for extra and add-on questions that came up during the interviews.  
Finally, the case of the Colombian coffee sector will be presented. The farmers’ organization 
Federación Nacional de Cafeteros de Colombia1, was able not only to establish their own brands of 
‘100% Colombian Coffee’ and ‘Juan Valdez’ but also move into the retailing business with the 
global opening of Juan Valdez Coffee Shops. Here I rely on secondary data again. The sources I use 
to describe, analyze and discuss this case are predominantly peer-reviewed articles which are 
reliable and valid. Furthermore, I used as many sources as I could find to enhance the reliability of 
the presented case. Through the analysis of this case, I will show that producing countries are not 
only able to create their own international brand, but can also engage in the direct retailing to 
consumers in consuming countries as well. This means a fully upgrading process for the FNC 
which is from ‘farm to cup’.  
The analysis of the above mentioned value chains will focus on the main aims of the different 
GVCs, the government structure that has been developed within the chains, the comparison of the 
GVCs, especially focusing on the steps taken in producing countries, and finally the comparison of 
how much value actually is captured by actors in producing countries. Through these analytical 
methods I will be able to answer the research question and at the same time offer suggestions for 
producing countries on how they could be able to capture more value in the global coffee value 
chain.  
 
 
                                                          
1 National Federation of Coffee Growers of Colombia (or FNC) 
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Contribution to Research 
This thesis contributes to the growing research on Global Value Chains in different ways. Firstly, 
no academic paper has yet described, analyzed and discussed the form of Direct Trade of Roasted 
Coffee. This is especially interesting, as this is the only form of trade in the coffee sector where 
actors from producing countries were able to functionally upgrade. Secondly, I am unaware of any 
other study that has compared 5 different GVCs of the same product and drawn conclusions from 
the analysis and discussion. Additionally, this unique case could provide guidance for other 
producing countries that engage in the coffee business. Thirdly, it shows that organizations in 
producing countries are able to become the lead firm in a GVC and govern the GVC from ‘farm to 
cup’ which is unprecedented in the coffee sector. Fourthly, through the comparison of the different 
GVCs the validity of the GVC analysis is further enhanced as their theoretic assumptions are further 
tested with this thesis.     
Brief Outline of Results 
The thesis concludes that though three out of four GVCs (Fair Trade, Direct Trade, and Direct 
Trade of Roasted Coffee) try to enhance the income of actors in producing countries, the main actor 
(roaster/distributor) in all GVCs is located in consuming countries. Additionally in three out of four 
GVCs (Conventional Trade, Fair Trade, and Direct Trade), producing countries occupy the position 
of green bean suppliers to actors in consuming countries; only in the case of Direct Trade of 
Roasted Coffee were actors able to functionally upgrade and therefore also scale up their share of 
value captured of the final retail price. Retailers (supermarket chains) in consuming countries were 
able to capture about 30 percent of the final retail value in all analyzed GVCs representing the 
maximum of share for producing countries observed in the GVC of Direct Trade for Roasted 
Coffee.  
This leads me to conclude that actors from coffee-producing countries should take opportunities to 
functionally upgrade as the share of captured value increases by about 50 percent if compared to 
Conventional Trade and Fair Trade. Furthermore, Fair Trade does neither enhance the position in 
the GVC nor the percentage captured of the final retail value by actors in producing countries. The 
same can be said about Direct Trade. However, both fulfill their promise of a higher income to 
farmers. Nevertheless, actors in producing countries are confined to the position of green bean 
suppliers in Fair Trade and Direct Trade. My findings show that a functionally upgraded coffee 
sector not only captures more value and secures the actors a more stable income, but at the same 
time leaves more possibilities for the actors involved. 
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Chapter 2 | Theory 
The starting point of Global Value Chain analysis is widely seen in a work written by Hopkins and 
Wallerstein (1986). The analysis was referring to commodity chains and focusing on how 
companies interact in the same chain. Hopkins and Wallerstein investigated the agricultural (and 
timber) production; basically the commodity chain was defined by Hopkins and Wallerstein (1986) 
as “a network of labor and production processes whose end result is a finished commodity” (ibid.: 
159). The definition used by this thesis of Global Value Chains is one created by Kaplinsky and 
Morris (2001): 
“The value chain describes the full range of activities that are required to bring a 
product or service from conception, through the different phases of production 
(involving a combination of physical transformation and the input of various 
producer services) delivery to final consumer, and disposal after use.” (ibid.: 4) 
The term chain is putting the “focus on vertical relationships between buyers and suppliers and the 
movement of a good or service from producer to consumer” (Gibbon & Ponte 2005: 77). A focus of 
GVC analysis is this vertical relationship, which is analyzed in terms of power relations. Especially, 
Gereffi & Korzeniewicz (1994) started to look deeper into power relations and governance within 
GVCs; using this work three basic steps can be highlighted: (1) linkage of value chains; (2) 
structure of companies involved; and (3) chain governance. The latter Gereffi divided into 
producer-driven and buyer-driven value chains. The broad term 'chain governance' is divided 
basically into two systems under which governance takes place. Additionally in his work three key 
dimensions of global value chains can be found: (1) input-output structures and geographical 
coverage of chains which can be used to outline chain configurations; (2) with the term of 'chain 
governance' entry barriers and chain coordination were looked at; and (3) the institutional frame 
work surrounding the chains, meaning that no firm is acting in a vacuum, but within given 
frameworks (Gereffi & Korzeniewicz 1994: 131ff).  
Later Gereffi et al. (2005) identified five ideal types of different power relations that can be found 
inside GVCs, from ‘market’ to ‘hierarchical’. Therefore, one of the core strengths of GVC analysis 
is that it helps to explain power relations, to make them visible, and to point out their consequences. 
Through the ability to use power relations, companies are able to erect barriers to entry or to 
overcome these barriers inside GVCs. The barriers essentially function as a protection against 
(higher) competition or against competition at all. Through the ability to use these barriers 
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companies can secure higher rents, as they are either alone in being able to surpass these barriers or 
among the few companies able to do so. 
The higher the barriers to entry, the higher the rents companies are able to gain from these barriers; 
additionally, these barriers keep competitors out of play, at least temporarily. Behind these barriers 
to entry, higher rents are secured due to more value being captured by firms that have overcome or 
erected barriers. Through the capturing of more value and securing of rents the companies behind 
barriers to entry are able to benefit from more stable prices at least as long as not (many) other 
companies are able to overcome these barriers. Additionally, higher rents and more captured value 
mostly mean a higher final income. (Kaplinsky 2005: 55) 
The only way of surpassing barriers to entry is by upgrading. This basically means overcoming the 
barriers to entry or to erect new ones, e.g. by innovation. Through the ability to overcome barriers 
to entry, more value can be captured and more rents are created; via this link the company which 
overcomes a barrier of entry is (mostly) receiving a higher income after surpassing barrier(s) of 
entry. Again, the higher the barrier, the more value is captured and the higher the gain in income 
will be. These are basic implications of the GVC analysis which, of course, apply to the coffee 
sector as well. Here barriers to entry, among others, are not only marketing, branding and 
advertising but, for example, the ability to blend any kind of coffee to individual brand taste.  
According to Kaplinsky and Morris (2014), additive GVCs form a key concept of coffee trade. 
Additive GVCs are value chains where different steps need to be taken sequentially for the final 
product (roasted coffee) to find its way to the consumers. Coffee trade always includes: (1) 
harvesting; (2) processing; (3) exporting and importing; (4) roasting; (5) retailing. However, the 
order can vary as will later be discussed. This specific concept of ‘additive GVCs’ has certain 
implications, which can be helpful to consider when addressing the research question, especially 
when looking at policies.  
This theory chapter will be divided into the following sub-chapters: (1) Power in GVC, where main 
concepts of power relations and explanations of these are outlined; (2) Barriers to entry which 
explains the main relevant concepts, and gives the reader a more profound basis of what these 
barriers to entry can consist of; (3) Upgrading, mainly different ways through which companies are 
able to ‘upgrade’ and capture more value are given; and (4) Additive GVCs, where the concept is 
explained and its implications for policies are pointed out.   
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2.1. Power Relations in GVCs  
As already pointed out above, power relations are one of the main concepts throughout GVC 
analysis ‘history’. Being one of the core concepts, it is needed to be understood quite well to follow 
other arguments made in this thesis. Basically, there are two different interlinking models that were 
proposed by Gereffi (1994) and Gereffi et al. (2005) to analyze and understand power relations 
inside specific GVCs. Firstly, Gereffi (1994) divided GVCs into to two groups: (1) producer-driven; 
and (2) buyer-driven. Both groups had different implications for the power relations in play within 
the GVCs. The buyer-driven group is of special interest to my research question, due to the 
inherently buyer-driven nature of coffee´s GVC, as a primary commodity value chain. In 2005, 
Gereffi et al. built upon their earlier work to construct a five step model of different power relations 
at play within GVCs. The model does not explicitly forward the idea of power relations, however it 
is still an essential part of this model. Therefore these two concepts will be used in this thesis to 
further describe and categorize power relations which will be found along the different coffee 
GVCs that are analyzed. Power is at the core of the GVC approach as the actors that govern a chain 
“can actively shape the distribution of profits and risk in an industry” (Gereffi 2014: 13). 
Buyer-driven and producer-driven  
Originally, the differentiation in the GVC analysis had been made between producer-driven and 
buyer-driven as the two main features of how chains were governed differently. As the names 
indicate, one was mainly governed by the producer while the other by the buyer. Interestingly, these 
different governmental structures could be found in different sectors; usually, the producer-driven 
chain was found in sectors with high technological and capital requirements. Here, the direct link to 
entry barriers can be made as these were usually constituted of capital and expertise. Therefore, the 
name of producer-driven was given to the chains as the producer usually had these requirements 
and was able to remain behind these barriers to entry and govern the chain. Due to these 
circumstances, the producer usually maintained control of the value chain. However, buyer-driven 
chains are found in more labor-intensive sectors. Here barriers to entry are market information, 
product design and marketing. In these chains, production is usually not performed by leading 
companies, but rather the above mentioned activities of branding, product design and marketing; 
meaning, in buyer-driven chains the buyer is able to govern the chain and the power relations are in 
the buyer´s favor. (Gereffi & Korzeniewicz 1994: 131ff) 
The basis for these two structures is found in the production level. Either a producer is able to 
produce a distinguishable product, which inspires consumer demand, or producers are only able to 
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offer an indistinguishable product to the market, leaving them in a high competition field, as the 
product can be easily offered by other producers as well. With these different producer level factors, 
barriers to entry play a role as well: as in low-end production as agricultural commodities, a main 
feature of the chain is huge quantities of low-skill labor.  
Model by Gereffi et al. (2005)  
Following in the steps of the above presented categories, Gereffi, Humphrey and Sturgeon (2005) 
proposed a more differentiated model. Their starting point was a matrix with the variables of (1) 
complexity of transactions, (2) ability to codify transactions, and (3) capabilities in the supply-base. 
The matrix left them with five options for governmental structures of global value chains: market, 
modular, relational, captive and hierarchy. (ibid. 2005: 85ff) 
These different types are sorted according to their degree of explicit coordination and degree of 
power asymmetry, starting with market which has the least degree of explicit coordination and the 
least degree of power asymmetry, and ending with hierarchical, where the highest degrees of both 
exist. As the figure states, a firm acts as an integrated company starting from raw materials to the 
end user and thereby inheriting a whole value chain in the company. The governmental structures 
modular, relational, and quasi-hierarchical ascend in this order in their degree of explicit 
coordination and power asymmetry. 
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The Five Types of Value Chain Governance 
The governance within hierarchy is “characterized by complex transactions, difficult codification 
and low capability of suppliers” (Gereffi et al. 2005: 83). This leads to strong control by a firm (e.g. 
through mangers-subordinates, headquarters-subsidiaries, etc.) meaning that the whole value chain 
is controlled by one company; while this company captures all value added along the chain. Gibbon 
and Ponte (2005) point out that “[h]ierarchy emerges with very complex products and no competent 
suppliers. In this case, the buyer has to establish necessary skills and know-how inside the 
company” (ibid. 2005: 82). The total opposite, as already pointed out above, to hierarchy is the 
market type where no control of the value chain by a specific company can be recognized. Rather, 
all actors participating in the value chain from raw material to the end product are meeting in a 
(‘perfect’) market with the governance enacted by supply and demand.   
As one can see in the figure above, there are also different types of suppliers presented. In market 
they are termed suppliers; in modular there are component and material suppliers as well as in 
relational; in quasi-hierarchical there are captive suppliers. This leads to three different supplier 
types: (1) commodity suppliers supplying standard products; (2) captive suppliers supplying non-
standard products; and (3) turn-key suppliers providing products for special needs of buyers. 
(Gereffi et al. 2005: 83ff)  
Figure 2: Five global value chain governance types (Gereffi et al. 2005: 89) 
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Depending on which category the producer belongs to influences the power structure the suppliers 
have to accept in the value chain. The more sophisticated the product provided, the higher the rent, 
the higher the barriers to entry, and the more power they gain themselves; this is the case if 
specialized products for buyer needs are provided, for example. If a standard product is provided, 
meaning low barriers to entry, this leads to more power struggles and leading less value captured.  
However, in the case of the coffee GVC, suppliers (coffee farmers) are generally speaking 
commodity suppliers, as they provide an undifferentiated product to a global market, even though 
there are initiatives that try to change coffee beans to a differentiated product. This is the case in 
Fair Trade and Direct Trade; both of them will be described closer later in this thesis, but 
fundamentally they attempt to transform coffee farmers from commodity suppliers to captive 
suppliers.  
The limitations of the framework presented above lie within the value chains. Even though the 
framework captured shows coordination patterns in the overall value chains, links inside the value 
chains can be governed by different types of power relation when compared within the value chain. 
This leads to the conclusion that interactions of actors at different positions along the value chain 
can be determined by different frameworks and power relations. However, the framework provided 
by Gereffi, Humphrey and Sturgeon (2005) will be used in the thesis as it provides a stable basis for 
determining the different governmental structures, either along the value chain or inside it. The 
problem that different types of governmental structures can play a role within the value chain is an 
important addition and will help to clarify from where the power derives and which actor is that 
'drives' the global value chain.  
2.2. Barriers to Entry  
As mentioned above barriers to entry have different implications: to be able to secure higher 
economic rents, capture more value and finally, gain a higher income. Therefore, these barriers to 
entry are another key concept that directly derive out of power structures within GVCs. Power 
almost always is used to erect these barriers to entry; however, these barriers to entry can have two 
very different emerging points: (1) from within GVCs; and (2) outside of GVCs. In the following 
subchapter the two different barriers to entry will be further explained and analyzed. The effects for 
companies are essential to their profitability, their ability to capture more value within a given GVC 
and finally, to gain a higher income along the GVC.  
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Essentially, there are two different types of barriers to entry. The first barriers develop out of 
'governance' over a production process. These barriers can mostly be found inside companies and 
their partners and in the value chains they operate in; therefore the first type is called here 'barriers 
within global value chains'. The second type can almost only be found outside of the corporate 
world, consisting of the availability of natural resources or barriers created outside of the 
companies' spheres, e.g. laws made by governments. (Kaplinsky 2005: 64) 
2.2.1. Barriers to Entry within the GVC 
The GVC literature, including Gereffi (1994) and most following works, views barriers to entry as a 
competitive advantage. This is the case because barriers to entry, once passed, can bring benefits. In 
light of this, 3 different types of barriers are described: (1) economics of scale, (2) cost advantage, 
and (3) product differentiation advantage. In ‘Trading Down’ Gibbon and Ponte (2005) add to this 
list the element of 'innovation in supply chain organization', meaning that the organization of a 
supply or value chain itself can inherit barriers to entry and therefore give a company competitive 
advantages. This is the case in markets where a restricted number of lead firms and a large number 
of subordinate suppliers exist. All of these barriers are seen as temporary as they can be subject to 
change due to market force, technological advantage or innovation (Gibbon & Ponte 2005: 125f). 
As already mentioned above, the first differentiation in literature on chain analysis was between 
producer-driven and buyer-driven. These two different ways of governing had not only implications 
for the governance of the chain, but at the same time for barriers to entry. Depending on how the 
chain was/is governed, different barriers to entry appear. In producer-driven chains the entry 
barriers consist of capital and know-how as the chain is mostly found in sectors with high 
technological and capital requirements. (Daviron & Ponte 2005: 27f) 
“Given the capacity of producers to provide goods and services which costumers want, incomes can 
be high and sustainable if producers are able to protect themselves from competition by 
constructing, and/or taking advantage of, barriers to entry” (Kaplinsky 2005: 55). Therefore, 
producers that are unable to overcome barriers to entry and hide behind them are subjects of high 
competition on the 'global market'. Although barriers to entry (can) set the level of production level 
quite high, they also enable the producers, who overcome them, relatively stable rents.  
This leads to the final link between barrier of entry and income. According to Kaplinsky (2005), “it 
is obvious from this that the link between innovation and income is to be found in barriers to entry 
which keep out competition. Given that the product being manufactured is something consumers 
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want, the greater the barriers to entry, the more likely incomes will be high” (ibid.: 63). Therefore, 
barriers to entry secure higher income if they are overcome or placed between a company and 
competitors as the direct link of income. Barriers to entry are essential if the logic of value captured 
and upgrading is to be understood. Through barriers to entry the upgrading process is hindered or 
competitors are kept out of the market and therefore moving up the value chain is made more 
difficult.  
2.2.2. Barriers to Entry outside the GVC 
Barriers to entry, which are created or exist outside the sphere of companies, can be again divided 
into two fundamentally different groups: barriers constructed through action, laws by governments, 
for example; and barriers resulting from (natural) scarcity, such as access to rare resources 
(Kaplinsky 2005: 79). I discuss the following barriers closer: (1) investment, (2) trade secrets and 
property rights, (3) market and public regulation, (4) infrastructure, (5) geography, and (6) scarcity. 
(1) The different power structures evolving from producer- or buyer-driven governance in the 
GVCs are not the only problems for companies that try to move up the value chain. Sometimes the 
capital needed to move into market (segments) is underestimated and firms withdraw from the 
attempt to enter a market. An example can be seen in the study of apparel companies in Mexico that 
wanted to move into the North American market (Bair & Gereffi 2001). They withdrew because of 
the risk such investment would have entailed.  
(2) Next to the above mentioned barriers, there are essentially two created socially: (a) trade secrets; 
and (b) property rights. The first can be applied to many technological processes where claiming a 
patent would give opponents the knowledge of used parts and inventions. Therefore many processes 
are kept as trade secrets; in the coffee sector this would apply to the ingredients of specific coffee 
blends which brands offer to the consumer. The second is formal registration of such innovations 
(or trade secrets, etc.) There are mainly six different types of intellectual rights: (a) patents; (b) 
copyrights; (c) design registration; (d) trademark; (e) brand names; and (f) geographical indicators 
(Kaplinsky 2005: 80f). All of these are used to protect actors from their competitors and are at the 
core of many companies. 
(3) Recently the two spheres of market and public regulations have become more intertwined. “This 
is clear in the case of the fresh vegetable trade, where a combination of E.U. food safety regulations 
and private standards have led to higher demands on suppliers for conformity with mechanisms” 
(Gibbon & Ponte 2005: 126). Therefore, the two can be seen as either a set of regulations that lately 
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are overlapping, even though they can be, of course, different. Nevertheless, the functions of both 
regulations are mainly the same for producers. They have to accept and apply to the requested 
standards if they want to stay in the market.  
(4) Besides availability of resources, the presence of an adequate distribution and communication 
infrastructure is a basic condition for value chain development and upgrading. “Weak infrastructure 
hampers efficient flow of products to markets and the exchange of market information upstream 
value chains” (van Dijk & Trienekens 2012: 60). 
(5) Geographic barriers can be broadly categorized into two groups: (a) low levels of available 
(physical) resources; referring to raw material, little energy or water sources provided; and (b) the 
geographic position, not only of the company but also the country in which the company is located 
i.e. if it is landlocked, how far the next possibilities for further transportation are, if rivers or oceans 
are suitable transporting systems, etc.; or distance to the final consumer market. (van Dijk & 
Trienekens 2012: 59f) 
(6) Resource is a barrier of entry given by nature if it is elsewhere scarce. The barrier of entry is 
therefore how to obtain the needed resource by companies. Scarcity is therefore an advantage for 
the country/company to whom this resource belongs. “Nevertheless, this barrier of entry is quite 
rare, seldom absolute, and mostly of only little importance” (Kaplinsky 2005: 79).  
As one can see, barriers to entry are not rare. “The lack of adjusted banking products, the 
nonexistence of sound (industrial) policies, the absence of organized farmers, high trade demand, 
etc. are just a few examples” (van Dijk & Trienekens 2012: 30). Additionally, all of these factors 
interact and influence each other, making it harder to determine exact causes or difficulties. GVC 
analysis and the view on barriers to entry within the framework can help to demonstrate which 
obstacles have to be overcome to capture more value, or where and by whom it is possible to gain 
access to a bigger share of captured value.  
2.3. Upgrading 
Upgrading is the only way for companies inside a GVC to overcome barriers to entry, secure higher 
rents, capture more value and therefore increase their income (Kaplinsky 2014: 339). Therefore this 
is a key concept for firms that want to upgrade. Existing ways to upgrade and finally gain a higher 
and (often) more stable income are shown. Upgrading can be therefore understood as a method not 
only for overcoming obstacles to gain income but also for gaining more power along the GVC. This 
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is due to the fact that companies are able to overcome or erect barriers to entry and can use their 
(new) position to gain more income, capture more value and increase their rents through an act of 
changing ‘power relations’ within a specific GVC. Hereby, power means overcoming barriers to 
entry, capturing more value and higher income. This supports the notion that companies in 
developing countries would be able to change the power relations within GVCs through upgrading. 
If in the coffee GVC, for example developing countries are able to roast coffee, power relations 
would change in their favor as they would have overcome a major barrier of entry. To explain 
further the above mentioned factors, this chapter is divided into the following: (1) upgrading itself; 
(2) positive benefits of upgrading; (3) obstacles of upgrading; (4) upgrading for lead firms; and (5) 
upgrading for suppliers.  
In this thesis upgrading is understood as “the process of acquiring capabilities and accessing new 
market segments through participating in particular chains” (Humphrey 2003: 2). This supports 
Gereffi’s statements that upgrading can be seen as a process where knowledge flows from a lead 
firm to its suppliers. That leads then to his argument that upgrading is better achieved by firms 
through learning from lead firms rather than interaction of firms at the same level within the value 
chain (Gereffi 1999.: 65ff).  
Additionally, there have to be certain conditions under which any company or country can upgrade 
their value chain and thereby capture more value in a specific chain (Staritz and Morris 2012: 14). 
There are four basic conditions which can be met to upgrade a value chain: (1) access to knowledge 
and technology; (2) access to affordable credit; (3) market opportunities; and (4) farmer 
organization. (van Dijk & Trienekens 2012: 78ff) 
As already described in the chapter on barriers to entry, there are many obstacles that have to be 
overcome if a company wants to upgrade. According to Kaplinsky (2005), there are essentially four 
different ways of upgrading: (1) process upgrading; (2) product upgrading; (3) functional 
upgrading; and (4) chain upgrading. These four ways inherit different strategies and, of course, 
different paths of upgrading. Additionally, these paths have different implications for the value 
captured in the chain. For example, through functional upgrading actors are able to capture more 
value within the GVC by the new acquired task.   
The first, as the name suggests, increases the efficiency of a process chain, leading to a model that 
is significantly better than that of competitors. The efficiency can be increased both and between 
links in the chain. The second means that new products are introduced more quickly by the 
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upgrader than by competing firms. Here upgrading means both upgrading old products or 
innovation and putting new products out to the market. Thirdly, the field of responsibility of a 
company is changed or extended, e.g. moving from logistics to quality management, meaning that a 
company's core responsibility changes either completely in the value chain or more tasks are carried 
out, and therefore capturing more value. Lastly, companies will move from one value chain to 
another where more value can be captured and the skills acquired for the chain they were in before 
can be used and/or built up on. (Kaplinsky 2005: 107f)  
Gibbon and Ponte (2005) add to this list the importance of achieving greater economies of scale to 
help to secure a stable and profitable (supplier) position in the value chain. They also suggest a 
focus on “identifying structures of rewards available to suppliers within specific chains, on the one 
hand, and concrete roles releasing these rewards on the other” (ibid.: 29).  
There are several positive effects of upgrading and participating in global value chains. These 
include the meeting of certain quality standards, as well as, control of processes and flows of goods 
and information. Often this knowledge is passed on within the GVC from one company to another. 
However, the overall question that remains is how producers from developing countries are able to 
enter these value chains and how they can upgrade to be able to compete (van Dijk & Trienekens 
2012: 45). This adds to the already named effects on income growth and the economy if companies 
participate in GVC or are able to upgrade (within) GVCs. 
Nevertheless, several studies (among others Gibbon 2000; Bair and Gereffi 2001; Chui and Wong 
2004) showed that firms in developing country had difficulties moving up value chains and thereby 
capturing more value. Most of the difficulties were encountered when companies tried to upgrade 
their function, as for example when a textile producer wanted to create their own brand, shown by 
Gibbon.  
Upgrading for lead firms  
One of the reasons why upgrading beyond production is not easy to achieve seems to be buyer-
power. Palpacuer (2000 as quoted in Schmitz 2004: 359) pointed out, that the source of power and 
therefore governance does not lie in producing activities anymore. The main power in global value 
chains is found in branding, marketing, product development and/or coordination of inter-firm 
relations. Many lead firms withdrew from goods almost entirely and are focusing on these non-
production activities. This allowed them to focus on their lead firm competences of marketing and 
branding. As Bazan and Alemán (2004) explain, these core competences are, of course, not passed 
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on to their suppliers. In the Brazilian footwear industry they showed that Brazilian suppliers were 
discouraged from functional upgrading by their main US buyers. This shows that it is not only 
upgrading that has to be faced by companies in developing countries, but at the same time they have 
to deal with the pressure of buyer-power in the global value chains in which they participate.  
Upgrading in the global value chain is possible and done by companies, through the most efficient 
step of 'functional upgrading'.  Nevertheless, it is one that only very few companies are able to take 
(the example of Juan Valdez Coffee Shops is given in chapter 6 of this thesis). There are different 
reasons for this conclusion, but “[w]orking for foreign buyers and accepting quasi-hierarchy is a 
tempting solution, even if it means lower profit margins” (Schmitz 2004: 360). This means that 
instead of taking the risky step of functional upgrading, where a lot of capital is invested, many 
companies would rather stay in the low-end supplier status and accept the power relations in the 
global value chain. 
Upgrading for suppliers  
There are specific conditions and a certain framework for producers of primary goods if they want 
to upgrade. Gibbon (2001; 2003) argues that though limitations exist, three basic upgrading forms 
are available for commodity suppliers:  (1) capturing higher margins; (2) producing new forms; and 
(3) localizing commodity processes. Firstly, margins can be maximized by using economy of scale, 
meaning increasing volume. At the same time, higher margins can be achieved if the quality of a 
product is improved or if, for example, reliability of supply is assured (Gibbon 2001: 352). 
Secondly, this opposes the idea of quality, following rather on the possibilities of producing new 
forms of raw materials; Gibbon points out 'user-specified' commodity forms (ibid.: 353). Thirdly, 
this puts the focus on the steps needed to further process raw materials; here, the possibility of 
upgrading lies within the possibility of further processing and thereby capturing more value and at 
the same time gaining knowledge. These steps usually need technology and skills for the 
processing.  
As pointed out earlier, the possibilities seem limited and have a tighter framework as for other 
suppliers, for example in the manufactured sector (through they face other obstacles). At the same 
time, these three key factors point out the core areas where upgrading can take place for raw 
material suppliers, with the third one of 'localizing commodity processes' (mostly) inheriting the 
highest upgrading possibility, and therefore the best way to capture more value for raw material 
producers.  
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2.4. Additive GVCs 
Kaplinsky and Morris (2014) recently added a new layer of diversification on the GVC approach. In 
their text “Thinning and Thickening: Productive Sector Policies in the Ear of Global Value Chains”, 
they propose a further distinction in the GVC analysis between two different GVC families: (1) 
chains which involve ‘vertical specialization’; and (2) chains that are ‘additive’ in nature 
(Kaplinsky & Morris 2014: 7). This distinction can be seen as an add-on to buyer- and producer-
driven separation of GVCs. However, Kaplinsky and Morris are approaching GVCs through the 
lens of how policies can support GVCs in developing countries.  
Their starting point lies within how developing countries can use their “capacity to exploit resource 
rents, to generate rents through innovations, to protect rents by constructing or taking advantage of 
barriers to entry and then, finally, to appropriate rents” (Kaplinsky & Morris 2014: 4). The two 
different presented chains can be differentiated according to the following characteristic: the more 
complex the chain is, the higher the possibility is that it is a vertically specialized chain. These 
chains usually can be found in the manufacturing sector (e.g. car industry). However, additive 
chains are usually found in the resource sector where sequential steps have to be taken to finally 
deliver the product to consumers (Kaplinsky & Morris 2014: 8). Typical examples are the cocoa or 
coffee GVC.  
The two authors propose two fundamentally different policy approaches to support either the 
vertically specialized or the additive chain. When vertically specialized chains are considered, the 
authors propose a ‘thinning’ of the chain, which means that “the objective here is to reduce the 
impediments to international trade, such as removing quotas and tariffs on imports, introducing 
incentives to promote exports and removing ‘at border’ bureaucracy and obstacles which hinder 
trade” (Kaplinsky & Morris 2014: 16). On the other hand, the authors propose a ‘thickening’ for 
additive chains which refers to building linkages within the GVC or similar GVCs (Kaplinsky & 
Morris 2014: 18). They end with four proposals of what can be done by policy-makers in 
developing countries: (1) participation in GVCs have great potential, which must be used to avoid 
the ‘dark side of globalization’; (2) a key element is to be able to have a secure dealing with rents, 
as they are essential for economies and the gains generated through GVCs; (3) rent agendas have to 
be seen in a specific temporal and sectoral context; and (4) each GVC of the whole GVC family has 
its specific requirements. (Kaplinsky & Morris 2014: 21f)  
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Finally, Kaplinsky and Morris point out that the core concept to functional upgrading is leaving 
manufacturing, farming and/or mining and to be able to carry out activities such as design, 
branding, marketing and logistics (Kaplinsky & Morris 2014: 22). Additionally, they point out that 
these different policies have fundamental implications for the whole society as they are able to 
spread gains from globalization (Kaplinsky & Morris 2014: 23).  
 
Chapter 3 | Conventional Coffee GVC 
I will briefly outline the history of coffee trade as the origins of coffee trade are important if the 
‘conventional coffee GVC’ is looked at more closely. Then, the International Coffee Agreement 
(ICA) and its abolishment in 1989 will be outlined which led to the predominant coffee trading 
form of today. I showed before that at least 86 percent of all coffee is traded in the conventional 
coffee GVC. Finally, global production and prices from 1990 to 2012 are analyzed and put into 
context, showing that despite the price volatility the overall production has steadily increased over 
the past 20 years. Hereafter, I examine the conventional coffee GVC, displaying all different steps 
taken from farm to consumers in the GVC are outlined, described and analyzed. The conventional 
coffee GVC can be thought of has having the shape of an hourglass, concerning the numbers of 
actors. The vast majority of coffee is produced by millions smallholders on the globe (Jha et al. 
2014: 417). On the other end are millions of consumers that drink millions of cups of coffee every 
day, making both ends of the GVC widespread and diverse. In the middle, however, at the level of 
traders and roasters a concentration of key actors can be observed who accordingly to the relevant 
theory are able to hide behind barriers to entry and keep competitors out of the market. These 
barriers to entry are marketing, branding and advertising. Roasters are the lead firms in the 
conventional coffee GVC, with the top ten companies controlling about 50 percent of all the coffee 
traded in the conventional coffee GVC.  
Brief History of Coffee Trade  
Originally farmed in the region of what is today Uganda and Ethiopia, coffee was traditionally 
produced, harvested and further processed here. After the discovery by the Arabs, they soon started 
to serve brewed coffee in coffee houses. Here it was noticed by Europeans and copied by them. 
Europeans used their colonies as coffee producers for their own demands (Clarence-Smith & Topik 
2003: 4ff). Here, the modern coffee trade started because the colonial powers let their colonized 
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nations plant and harvest coffee for them, leading to the structure of green coffee bean exporters 
and consuming countries. During colonial times, coffee cultivation was closely linked to cheap and 
forced labor in coffee-producing countries. During this time, the state played a major role in the 
coffee business. Here foundations were laid for heavy state controlled coffee production after 
colonial times. Later, Public Coffee Boards set prices and coffee exportation quotas (Fridell 2014: 
26f; ibid.: 47). 
One could say that the International Coffee Agreement (ICA) by the International Coffee 
Organization (ICO) was a direct result of heavy regulation of coffee markets nationally; leading to a 
relatively strict regulated coffee trade during the years of the ICA. The ICA was supported not only 
by producing but also consuming countries and was in place from 1963 to 1989. Prices were 
regulated and set by the distribution of quotas to producing countries. This ‘coffee cartel’ could 
only work because the biggest coffee-producing nations, among others the biggest producer Brazil, 
were taking part in it and not exceeding the set quotas (Fridell 2014: 58). During the period of the 
ICA prices were relatively stable, which helped coffee farmers to be able to plan ahead and to be 
assured of a relatively secure income (Daviron & Ponte 2005: 87). Consuming countries had an 
interest in a stable coffee market, as during the height of the Cold War efforts were made to support 
countries through regulations, so that they would not be tempted by communism (Fridell 2014: 
57f). During the times of the ICA, coffee roasters became another major actor. Through their 
inventions of coffee branding, heavy marketing and advertisement, they were able to take the role 
as major players in coffee trade.  
With the fall of the Iron Curtain and the downfall of the Soviet Union and with it the ideological 
war between communism and capitalism, the ICA was abolished in 1989. It was also mainly 
annulled due major producing and consuming countries backing out of the agreement, especially 
Brazil and the USA (Sarris & Hallam 2006: 285). Hereafter, the prices could not be set by quotas 
anymore, as major producers were no longer participating. Abandoning the cartel coffee trade 
entered the current ‘free market’ phase, which let supply and demand determine the price of green 
coffee beans. Through the new paradigm of liberalization many developing countries were ‘forced’ 
to open up to the world market and reduce government intervention in the market to a minimum. 
This meant for the coffee market the closure of most national coffee boards, which led ‘free market’ 
reaching the coffee producers (Fridell 2014: 64f). They were left to deal with this new situation 
mostly on their own. 
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Since then prices have been set for Arabica coffee at the 'Intercontinental Exchange' in New York, 
referred to as the ‘C’ price, and for Robusta coffee at the London based stock market 'Euronext'. 
Here, prices are regulated as in any other stock market. Prices are not only regulated by the demand 
and supply, but any other option that is practiced at modern stock markets comes into practice as 
well. Overall, this led to a more flexible and volatile market than before the ICA (Kolk 2012:80).  
Prices dropped dramatically immediately after the abolishing of the ICA between 1998 and 2002 
(Daviron & Ponte 2005: 88), because new players entered the coffee market. An important example 
is Vietnam, which boosted its coffee production in a relatively short period to become the second 
largest coffee supplier today. Brazil still leads the global coffee production quantitatively speaking, 
followed by Vietnam and then Indonesia (TCC 2014). Though quantities fluctuate to some extent 
from year to year, the overall tendency shows growth (Sarris & Hallam 2006: 286). Prices dropped 
during these periods due to new players and significant amounts of 'new' coffee entering the market. 
Prices and Statistics 
Despite all discussions about coffee trade and the impact it has for small-holders, especially during 
the ‘coffee crisis’ between 1998 and 2002, the global production of coffee was in a steady growth 
between the abolishment of the ICA and 2012. Production went up from over 93 million bags 
(1990) to almost 145 million bags (2012), whereas exports grew from close to 80 million bags 
(1990) to just over 113 million bags (2012). In 1990 close to 85 percent of the produced coffee was 
exported, but in 2012 this figure dropped to 78 percent. Exports in coffee trade are important as 
many developing countries are still strongly dependent on the export earnings from coffee, such as 
Uganda, Ethiopia and Rwanda (MIT Atlas 2015).  
 
Figure 3: Global production and exports of coffee - 1990 to 2012 (numbers by ICO 2014; graph by author) 
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It can be seen that production and exports of coffee grew at almost similar rates, meaning that 
despite all discussions about farmer livelihoods, coffee prices and volatility on coffee markets, the 
overall market itself grew steadily in size over the last 20 years. This could only be done through 
exports to emerging markets, such as South Korea, as consumption appeared to level out in 
traditionally coffee-drinking countries, such as the USA or the EU.  
This graph is much more informative when considered alongside coffee prices during the same 
period. Below the price paid to coffee growers and the retailer price in US$ cents for a pound of 
coffee is shown. USA and Germany represent the two major coffee importing countries in the 
world, while Brazil, Colombia and Vietnam represent three major exporting countries. 
 
 
Figure 4: Price to Growers and Retailer Price from 1990 to 2010 (numbers by ICO 2014; graph by author) 
What the figure can show is that the coffee market is highly diverse. There are some major trends, 
especially for coffee-producing countries which are not necessarily reflected in the retail price. For 
coffee-producing countries the diversity from country to country and especially from type (Arabia 
or Robusta) can be seen. The price received by producers varies depending on country of origin and 
type of coffee. Arabicas always receive a higher price than Robustas. Vietnamese Robusta received 
mostly a lower price than Braizilan Robusta, and Colombian Arabicas usually a higher price than 
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Brazilian Naturals. All of these are differently graded and processed beans and therefore are listed 
differently at the stock markets.  
The two displayed retail markets also display an upwards tendency, except for a major negative 
trend between 1998 and 2002/3. Interestingly if put in context with the overall production of coffee, 
one can see that no price decrease stopped the overall growth in production and exports of coffee; 
only that exports levelled out during times of lower prices. Here, a five year trend in prices to 
growers can be shown: from 1993 to 1998 high prices could be observed while from 1999 to 2004 
low prices were dominant. From 2005 to 2011 prices increased again, with a peak in 2011 after 
which prices fell dramatically.  
Another interesting aspect is that prices paid to producers are much more volatile than retail prices. 
In total, retail prices vary by a facotr of 2. Colombian producers expereicen the smalles variation in 
price which is by a factor of 3. Brazlian Naturals showed the highest change as their prices were 7 
times higher in 2011 than in 2002. However, on average the prices changed by a factor of 5 for 
growers. All of these findings align with the relevant literature on price volatility for coffee 
producers, especially when compared to price variations of the retail price: prices to producers 
experienced more than double the volatility than retail prices. 
One of the reasons why retail prices are not subjected to significant changes could be found in the 
analysis of the GVC of conventional coffee, especially, in the lead firms of the whole chain, namely 
roasters. As they are the key player in the market, they are also better able to absorb price volatility 
and changes in the coffee price. Why they are the key player in the GVC and how they are able to 
absorb price volatility will be explained and analyzed in the following chapter on the Conventional 
Coffee GVC.  
3.1. Conventional Coffee GVC 
Following the basic theoretical red-thread of my thesis, whoever has the most power in the GVC is 
able to erect or surpass barriers to entry, is able to capture high rents and more value and has finally 
the highest income within the GVC. Following this approach, first, I describe the basic value chain 
step by step. Hereafter, I discuss barriers to entry affecting the value captured by the different actors 
along the conventional GVC. As already discussed earlier, coffee is mostly produced in developing 
countries and consumed in developed countries. Shown below are the different steps that coffee 
follows from farms to consumers in importing countries.  
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Figure 5: The coffee value chain on conventional market (Kaplinsky 2006) 
As can be seen, the value chain in the conventional market consists of 7 steps with an optional 8th, 
from farm level to the consumer's coffee cup. These steps are as followed: (1) harvesting and the 
first step of processing on the farm; (2) the processing company; (3) the exporter prepares the coffee 
for transportation and customs; (4) via freight transportation coffee reaches the consuming 
countries; (5) the importer is responsible for customs in the consuming/ further processing country; 
(6) the roaster/further processing company roasts and grinds the coffee, packages it and is 
responsible for marketing and branding; (7) through retailers the coffee reaches the final consumer 
for at home consumption; or (8) the coffee is consumed in a coffee bar. In this chart, three steps are 
taken in producing countries and three steps in consuming countries, not showing the difference in 
value captured along the value chain by the different actors or the difference in numbers of actors 
involved.   
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The requirements from the big roasters for minimum quantity and quality influence the barrier of 
entry, meaning that as a supplier for big roasters, not only is a certain quantity needed, but the 
quality needs to meet minimum requirements and should be fairly similar from harvest to harvest. 
From these requirements, coffee-producing firms should be able to monitor the coffee which they 
produce and trade, considering among other aspects the size, defects, contamination, humidity, etc. 
(Gibbon & Ponte 2005: 130f)  
Roasters are able to erect and hide behind barriers to entry as they control the branding of coffee, 
are directly located in the consumer markets, know what consumers look for and are able to demand 
minimum quality and quantity from their suppliers, i.e. traders and coffee farmers. As pointed out 
by Hutchens (2009), branding is one of the key attributes of roasters in the conventional GVC 
(ibid.: 45f). There are four major reasons for roasters being able to erect and hide behind these 
barriers to entry, which have been erected over the last decades and complicate upgrading in the 
conventional GVC, especially functional upgrading. These four reasons are: (1) blending, (2) 
supplier-managed inventory (SMI) implementation, (3) liberalization; and (4) preventing (most) 
retailers from participating in the GVC. As they are the major reasons why roasters are able to hide 
behind barriers to entry, I explain them in detail below. 
With technological advances, roasters were enabled to blend different kinds of coffee to create a 
taste unique to their brand. The innovation was in the way blending could be achieved: Before, 
roasters needed to buy certain kinds of coffee beans with specific taste attributes whereas today, 
roasters are almost able to create their 'own' taste without the necessity of buying beans of certain 
tastes. This technological advance gave the roasters more flexibility when buying coffee beans, 
leading to not only more flexibility while blending but also an advantage for traders, as roasters are 
no longer bound to certain coffee beans. (Ponte 2002: 1115; Fridell 2014: 55f)   
Through the implementation of supplier-managed inventory (SMI), roasters changed their relation 
to traders and indirectly suppliers. Through this inventory system traders are able to have a better 
overview of the demands and wishes of roasters and are able to purchase as roasters demand, 
leading to a more efficient connection between roasters and key traders (Wong et al. 2011: 357). 
Through the SMI, roasters are able to set the terms of trade further upstream the GVC. Again, this 
made roasters more independent from international traders.  
After 1989 liberalization was also a main driving paradigm in the coffee sector worldwide as shown 
before. During this time national public coffee boards were all dissolved, except in Colombia (Fold 
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& Larson: 65). In the course of liberalization, traders were able to build up tighter networks 
‘upstream’ in producing countries.  
Roasters were able to hold the lead market position for branding of coffee. Retailers tried to enter 
the coffee GVC as well as they did in other value chains, such as fruits, although almost all were 
non successful and withdrew from the coffee market (Daviron & Ponte 2005: 122). I will show that 
this is still applicable in figure 7 below. Additionally, Gibbon and Ponte (2005) found that coffee is 
sold sometimes by retailers at a loss, with the expectation, that consumers who buy coffee will pick 
up other items as well with a higher margin for the retailer (ibid.:116).However, my results suggest 
a different picture. 
Each of the above mentioned points lead to the conclusion that roasters hold the lead firm position 
in the conventional GVC, as they are able to hide behind barriers to entry in the conventional coffee 
GVC and at the same time are able to implement attributes that are in their favor in the GVC. 
Therefore, if roasters are able to erect most barriers to entry, they should govern the conventional 
GVC as well and be able to shape it in their favor.  
3.2. Governance in the conventional Coffee Value Chain 
The conventional coffee GVC can be categorized as a buyer-driven value chain, as is mostly the 
case with undifferentiated (agricultural) commodities. The traded product is green coffee beans, 
which can be produced almost anywhere, giving the right natural conditions. A historic basis for 
this system can be seen from colonial times as coffee was only produced for exports, to satisfy 
Western demands. Hereafter, through the ICA, trade was to some extent regulated. Coffee 
production usually exceeds demand leading to an oversupply which is still the case today. 
Therefore, coffee is not only an undifferentiated product but is almost always produced in excess, 
giving buyers yet more power, as they may freely choose from whom to buy their coffee, and the 
conditions of the transaction.  
Therefore, as in any other buyer-driven GVC, the power in the GVC lies within market information, 
knowledge about the market, design, marketing and advertisement, and most importantly branding. 
All of these tasks are carried out by roasters as has been shown. These findings are also supported 
by Ponte (2002) who states that the overall GVC is clearly buyer-driven and dominated by the 
roasters, as they define key terms of participation, either directly or indirectly, both for their own 
suppliers and actors further upstream the conventional coffee GVC (ibid.: 1112). In short, this 
makes roasters the lead companies in the conventional coffee GVC, leading to the conclusion that  
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“[t]he structure of the coffee market value chain can vary significantly in terms of the financial 
return and conditions for producers, but typically, and similar to tropical commodities more 
generally, coffee production occurs in ‘buyer-driven’ chains” (Hutchens 2009: 37). Nevertheless, 
the picture is much more diverse if specific types of coffee or specific regions are looked at, e.g. 
Colombian Milds from Colombia. There are many different premiums and attributes that are valued 
differently. However, all types of coffee experience price volatility as will be also shown later. 
I analyze the conventional coffee GVC with the five idealistic power-relation types described by 
Gereffi et al. (2005). However, it has to be noted that different steps are dominated by different 
power relations. An example is provided by Ponte (2002 as quoted in Gibbon & Ponte 2005: 83) 
where Ponte describes the coffee value chain with the focus on different knots in the value chain. 
For example, the relation of retailers and roasters are within in the 'market' sphere, the link between 
roasters and international trader are determined by 'modular' relations, the relation between 
international traders and exporters can be described as 'hierarchical', and in the coffee-producing 
countries themselves the trade relations between exporters and farmers/cooperatives/middlemen is a 
mix of different types ranging from 'market' and 'relational' to 'hierarchy'. Nevertheless, as Ponte 
(2002) points out, the overall global value chain is buyer-driven and even better described as 
roaster-driven as roasters are the lead firm in this GVCS (ibid.: 1114). Later Gibbon and Ponte 
(2005) point out “that different types of governmental structure can be found along the same value 
chain (ibid.: 82). However, the overall GVC can be mostly described as captive because of the 
hourglass shape of the market, the overproduction of coffee, and the power roasters hold. 
3.3. Prices and value in the conventional GVC 
As already pointed out, retail prices only changed by a factor of 2 between 1990 and 2011, whereas 
prices paid to the producers changed by a factor of 5 in the same period of time. This means that 
prices are more than double as volatile for producers as for retailers. These price findings support 
the argument that producers are not able to hide behind barriers to entry and experience higher price 
volatility than actors in the consuming country. In contrast, actors in consuming countries, 
especially roasters, are able to hide behind barriers and do not experience price volatility to the 
same extent that producers do. All of this presented evidence and arguments lead to the conclusion 
that roasters are the key actor in the Conventional Coffee GVC, especially as the roasters are able to 
capture not only the most value but are able to generate the highest profit margin along the value 
chain. (Raynolds 2002: 414) 
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Most value is expected to be captured in consuming countries and not producing countries. 
Additionally, roasters should capture the majority of the value created along the conventional GVC. 
Following the argumentation and research of Kaplinsky (2006), the different steps capture different 
amounts of the value of the final product. In the first step, at farm level, either 10 or 21 percent 
value is captured; the difference is for the most part explained if dry or wet processing is chosen. At 
the second level, the factory that further processes the beans captures either 20 or 9 percent of the 
final product; again depending on wet or dry processing. The exporter captures about 7 percent of 
the final value. All these steps take place in the country of origin, and lead to a total amount of 
around 37 percent of value added in the coffee-producing country. All other steps (if transportation 
is omitted) are taken in consuming countries, with the importer capturing about 8 percent, the 
roaster about 29 percent and the retailer about 22 percent value of the final product, adding to a total 
of 59 percent of the price of the final product which being captured in consuming countries. The 
remaining 4 percent is captured by the transportation company. The 4 percent are added to the 
amount of value captured by developed countries, leaving their share at 63 percent. The difference 
in value captured by developing and developed countries is 27 percentage points high, making the 
difference significant, as this is almost one third more value captured by developed countries than 
developing countries in the conventional coffee GVC. 
This is supported by further findings of Kaplinsky (2004) where he researched how much value was 
added (or captured) by the different actors along the conventional coffee GVC from 1965 to 2003. 
This 38 year interval shows relatively few changes, except between 1975 and 1985, but a steady 
tendency towards shrinking value captured in the producing countries and growth of the value 
captured by consuming countries is evident.   
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Proportion of Final Retail Price in the Coffee Value Chain 
 
Figure 6: Proportion of final retail price in the coffee value chain from 1995 to 2003 (Kaplinsky 2004: 87) 
Whereas in 1965 the value captured by producing countries was about 30 percent in total, excluding 
transportation, the amount shrank to less than 20 percent in 2003. In comparison, in 1965 
consuming countries captured about 65 percent, but in 2003 they were able to capture more than 80 
percent of the value of the final product. However, in 2008 consuming countries captured around 73 
percent value, transportation and weight loss amounted for almost 6 percent, middlemen in 
producing countries captured 3.5 percent and growers a total of 17.5 percent (Nielson 2014). This 
shows that also the ability to capture value among the players in the GVC not only differs from 
player to player, but also from year to year, as the graph above points out. However, the biggest 
share of the overall value was and still is captured in the consuming countries, whereas only 21 
percent of the retail value is captured in the producing country, following Nielson (2014). 
 This supports my earlier findings that if the power lies within consuming countries, as here 
companies are able to erect and hide behind barriers to entry, most value should be captured by 
these companies. As shown above, this is the case, though values captured depending on coffee 
prices, but nevertheless, usually 75 percent (or more) value is captured in consuming countries in 
the conventional GVC. This trend that consumer countries are able to capture bigger shares of the 
value chain can not only be observed in the conventional coffee GVC, but can be found among 
almost all food-based chains. This results in different shares of value captured by producing and 
consuming countries, leading to different 'incomes' within the GVCs (Kaplinsky 2004: 2). 
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Key-Player in the Conventional Coffee GVC  
The overall key actor in the conventional coffee GVC are roasters. This conclusion is supported by 
several authors, among others Ponte (2002), Raynolds (2002), Rice (2004), Daviron and Ponte 
(2005), and Hutchens (2009). Below the top ten roasters are listed, measured by the bags of coffee 
processed, in 2005 (only top five), 2008, 2010, and 2012/13:  
 
Figure 7: World leading coffee roasters 2005 – 2008 – 2010 – 2012/13 (numbers by TCC 2006, 2009, 2012, 2014; 
graph by author) 
 
In each of the displayed years all roasters are based in consuming countries. In 2012/13 out of the 
10 largest roasters globally, 5 are based in the USA, the largest single consumption market 
worldwide, showing that not only the concentration in roasters is very high, but also that the 
concentration in one country is clearly evident. If the shares of coffee which the above mentioned 
companies control are looked at, the high concentration is even more pronounced. Over the years 
these companies controlled 50.3 percent (2005), 53.6 percent (2008), 53.7 percent (2010), and 44.7 
percent (2012/13) of all coffee on export markets. These ten companies roasted about half of the 
globally available coffee that was exported by producing countries in the last ten year. This is 
supported by the findings of Hutchens (2009), who states that the global [conventional] coffee 
market is dominated by just a hand full of roasters (ibid.: 36).  
As already pointed out in the late 1990s by Talbot (1997), international traders played an important 
role and experienced a concentration of few companies ‘controlling’ huge shares of the market 
while liberalization took place. However, Talbot also pointed out that “[i]ntermediate traders and 
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processors, and exporters, get relatively small shares of the income and surplus” (ibid.: 83). This 
aligns with the picture Kaplinsky (2004) drew above in the analysis of the conventional coffee GVC 
where he describes the concentration of few globally active companies in the fields of roasting and 
trading.  
3.4. Part Conclusion 
As shown, roasters are the key actors in the conventional coffee GVC. Due to different reasons, like 
blending, SMI implementation and branding, they were able to position themselves as the key actor 
along the chain and sill hold this positon today. The key actor position is characterized by high 
barriers to entry, therefore higher rents, more captured value, and ultimately higher incomes among 
the firms operating in this position. As shown, all major roasters are based in consuming countries, 
especially USA, which is the biggest consumer country of coffee worldwide. The governance 
structure is highly influenced by the position roasters hold as they occupy the key company status in 
this buyer-driven GVC.   
This means for companies that want to upgrade, especially those in producing countries, that 
functional upgrading is very hard to achieve as the global market is already highly concentrated in 
the spheres of international traders and roasters. This leaves actors from developing countries in the 
position of green bean suppliers with low barriers to entry, high price volatility, low rents, less 
captured value, and eventually lower incomes than actors from consuming countries (mainly 
roasters). Few possibilities for upgrading are given in the conventional coffee GVC for coffee 
producers. 
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Chapter 4 | Fair Trade Coffee GVC  
As the first major alternative trading system that existed for producers to take part in, Fair Trade 
will be presented. Fair Trade serves as the example of labeled coffee, as Fair Trade was among the 
very first to actually ‘label’ coffee and therefore, tried to change the ‘conventional’ trading systems. 
Today, it is just one of many existing, though it is one of the best recognized and most familiar 
(Lyon et al. 2014: 142). 
On one hand, I will show that in the Fair Trade GVC producers are able to capture a higher 
percentage of value along the chain when compared to conventional trade. However, on the other 
hand, I will argue that the main power inside the Fair Trade GVC lies within consuming countries 
as the labelling organizations are mostly based within consumer countries, as well as the Fair Trade 
Label Organization (FLO) headquarters (in Bonn, Germany). Only Brazil, South Africa and (since 
2013) India have a national Fair Trade Organizations as well as production sites of Fair Trade 
products at the same time (FLO 2013/13). Furthermore, I will show that producers have very few 
possibilities to upgrade within the coffee chain and are essentially confined to their function as 
‘green bean’ suppliers. 
In the beginning, I will outline a brief history of the Fair Trade movement as well as statistics about 
Fair Trade and Fair Trade coffee, as these are crucial to understand and interpret the analysis that 
follows. Second, I will analyze and show how power relations along the Fair Trade GVC manifest, 
which actors are able to hide behind barriers to entry and who is able to capture the most value in 
the GVC. Finally the key actor will be presented and upgrading possibilities for coffee producers 
will be shown.  
4.1. History of Fair Trade   
The main aim of Fair Trade never changed completely during all the years it has existed. One of the 
main arguments for Fair Trade companies is “that if developing countries could obtain a fairer price 
for their goods, it would facilitate stronger, more diverse, and versatile national economies” (Tucker 
2011: 128). There are of course different ways of achieving the overall aim and here different 
ideologies, motivation and practices start to become noticeable, but the movement as a whole has 
always been quite diverse. Therefore, Fair Trade has not only the aim to secure better incomes for 
farmers, but in an overall perspective to have a positive impact on developing countries. This is 
exactly the reason why Fair Trade has come into existence; to support developing countries through 
an alternative trading system rather through donations and aid (Raynolds 2002).  
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In the late 1960s and 1970s Alternative Trade Organizations (ATOs) started to emerge as a result of 
people seeking alternatives to the 'conventional' trade. The core idea of these ATOs was 'trade not 
aid', which basically derives from the notion that trade between the developed North and the 
developing South is built on unequal terms. They also had a strong believe in trade rather than aid. 
As a result, in the late 1980s the European Fair Trade Association (EFTA) was established to avoid 
direct competition of Fair Traders (Renard 2003: 89f). In 1997, the Fair Trade Labeling 
Organization (FLO) was founded which aims at standardization of different national labeling 
processes and criteria (FLO 2014). 
While liberalization turned into a two sided coin for developing countries, Fair Trade took off, as it 
was one of the very few alternatives that were offered in special stores (One World Stores). Putting 
a sign against the falling commodity (especially agricultural) prices around the globe after 1989; 
this was also the case for coffee. The ICA was abolished and prices for coffee fell, leaving small 
scale producers with low market prices. At this time, coffee became one of the major Fair Trade 
products and the product by Fair Trader Organizations.  
As Fair Trade experienced high growth rates, other labels started to be used in the coffee sector: 
Following the lead of the Fair Trade label, Organic labelling entered the coffee market as well as 
the Rainforest Alliance certification, the C.A.F.E. by Starbucks or UTZ Kapeh, among others. The 
diversification of labeled coffee was mainly due to the fact that in the beginning of 2000’s 
transnational corporations started to enter the 'sustainable coffee' market in order “to enhance their 
public image and take advantage of higher prices paid for fair trade products” (Tucker 2011: 134). 
However, the different labels even though grouped together under 'sustainable coffee' have different 
foundation origins and principles. This thesis focuses on Fair Trade, as it is the oldest of all labels, 
for more details see section on ‘Fair Trade Principles’ below. In short, for Raynolds et al. (2007) the 
uniqueness of Fair Trade also lies in “its emphasis on trade criteria: its price guarantees and long-
term relations” (Raynolds et al. 2007: 228). The Fair Trade label is still the only label that has a 
minimum price guarantee for farmers. 
In general two main opposing 'parties' evolved inside the Fair Trade movement in the last decade as 
more and, especially, larger actors entered the Fair Trade market. One of the results was the 'split' of 
the Fair Trade movement. Raynolds et al. (2007) refer to these two opposing ideas as (1) movement 
and (2) market actor. Resulting in different ideological positions and leading to two different ways 
of pursuing Fair Trade (Hutchens 2009: 106). As a reaction many companies that were affiliated 
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with Fair Trade before either surrendered the label, found their own label or are simply trading on 
their own principles. For example, Fair Trade USA withdrew from the FLO in 2012 (FLO 
2012/13). Other effects were the establishing and growth of alternatives to Fair Trade; one which, 
Direct Trade, will be discussed later in this thesis. The split could also be observed in the coffee 
sector as Fair Trade became more mainstream and more ‘conventional’ and bigger companies 
joined Fair Trade coffee sales. Eventually two main poles formed within the Fair Trade GVC, 
depending on their motivation and practices within the Fair Trade GVC. This resulted from larger 
companies starting to purchase Fair Trade coffee without committing fully to all principles of Fair 
Trade. (Jaffee 2007: 205) 
4.2. Fair Trade Overview 
 
Figure 8: Global Sales Volumes of Fair Trade (numbers by FLO2; graph by author) 
Sales of Fair Trade products have experienced steady growth over the last decades while 
quadrupling between 2005 and 2010 (Lyon et al. 2014: 142).Coffee was and still is one of the major 
pillars of Fair Trade. Bananas account for half of the volume whereas coffee is responsible for 
almost half of the value of all Fair Trade goods (Elliot 2012: 8); Additionally, Fair Trade coffee has 
wide consumer recognition (Lyon et al. 2014: 142). Therefore, coffee is one of the crucial products 
in the Fair Trade market (Jaffee 2012: 95; Dragusanu et al. 2014: 219), as it was additionally one of 
the earliest certified products available on the market, and the first available in huge quantities. 
Fair Trade is the only label that has a minimum price guarantee for coffee producers. Currently the 
minimum price is set at US$ 1.50 per pound for Arabica coffee, and if the “C” market surpasses this 
mark the ‘conventional’ market price is paid with an additional US$ 0.20 premium (Bacon et al. 
2014: 136).   
                                                          
2Annual Reports of: FLO 2005/06, FLO 2007, FLO 2007/08, FLO 2008/09, FLO 2009/10, FLO 2010/11, FLO 2011/12, FLO 
2012/13, and FLO 2013/14; for more details see bibliography. 
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Figure 9: The conventional Arabica coffee price 1989 to 2012 with Fair Trade price 1989 to 2012  
(Fairtrade Foundation 2012) 
The graph shows that the Fair Trade Minimum Price provides a buffer for coffee farmers especially 
in times of very low prices, as experienced right after the collapse of the ICA and during the coffee 
crisis from 1998 to 2002 (Dragusanu et al. 2014: 220). Whereas in times of high coffee prices, Fair 
Trade pays an additional premium to the “C” price to the farmers. This makes Fair Trade especially 
interesting for farmers in times of very low prices.  
4.3. Fair Trade Coffee GVC  
The GVC is set up by a maximum of 5 steps from farmer level to consumption level. These steps 
include; (1) farmers who are, by necessity, organized in cooperatives. In these cooperatives more 
steps of value adding are being performed and therefore more value is captured here. These steps 
include private intermediate, processing plant, and local exporter; (2) international trade; (3) 
roasting company; (4) retailer; and (5) consumer.  
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The Fair Trade Value Chain 
As Fair Trade is organized via a labelling organization and is mostly distributed by Fair Trade 
companies, two additional key elements have to be pointed out in the GVC of Fair Trade coffee: (1) 
FLO International as the international labelling organization; and (2) the national FLO members 
through which much of the labeled products are promoted for consumers.  
The main barriers to entry are fulfilling all the requirements established by FLO International and 
then being certified by FLO-CERT. Entry is further complicated by the audit of farms and the 
farmer cooperative that must be paid by the farmers themselves and leads to additional monetary 
costs that are not easily paid by all small-holders. The amount of Fair Trade coffee that can be sold 
under the Fair Trade label reaching Fair Trade prices can be difficult to predict for the farmers and 
so can, consequently, the success of investment made by farmers and their cooperatives. As Mohan 
(2010) points out, only an estimated 30 percent of coffee produced for Fair Trade was sold in the 
Fair Trade market to its specific conditions (ibid.: 38f).  
There are different standards farmers must fulfill to be allowed to participate in Fair Trade. Among 
these are: (1) being a small grower; (2) being organized through a politically/independent 
Figure 10: The Fair Trade Value Chain (Slob 2006: 23) 
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democratic organization (mostly farmer cooperatives); (3) limiting use of pesticides and herbicides 
(Raynolds 2002). Additionally, farmers must finance the FLO-CERT certification process, which 
amounts to about US$ 3.200 (Weber 2007: 114). This is criticized by, among others, Smith (2010: 
35) as the costs were previously covered by FLO and its affiliates. However, when all of these 
standards are met, farmers are able to participate in Fair Trade. 
Importing and/or roasting companies must also accept, apply and act according to Fair Trade 
standards which are set by FLO International. These standards include: (1) Fair Trade coffee has to 
be bought directly from grower organizations and should preferably use agreements that last 
beyond one growing cycle; (2) they are obligated to pay the Fair Trade Minimum Price and 
premiums to farmer organizations; and (3) they have to offer up to 60 percent pre-financing of the 
contract value. (Raynolds 2002) 
4.4. Governance of the Fair Trade GVC  
The overall coffee GVC is buyer-driven, as the coffee is produced undifferentiated and exported as 
green beans. Nevertheless, the difference lies within the labeling process of coffee as Fair Trade. 
Here, the differentiation is most evident in the consumer market, as the label indicates that all 
standards the label requires from farmers or roasters are met. Thus consumers, aware of what the 
label stands for, are willing to pay an extra premium. However, as Fair Trade coffee experiences a 
global overproduction, the Fair Trade GVC is mainly still buyer-driven, though changes are evident 
in both the GVC itself and its governance structure. As FLO International and FLO-CERT hold the 
key actor position, but are technically positioned outside of the GVC itself, the governance is not a 
clear factor in the Fair Trade GVC. Therefore the FLO International and FLO-CERT act more as 
gate keepers that ‘lead’ actors; basically regulating participation of the Fair Trade GVC.  
Analyzing the Fair Trade GVC with the ideal types of ‘power relations’ that Gereffi et al. (1994) 
proposed, the Fair Trade GVC can hardly be categorized. I will look at the two main nodes in the 
Fair Trade GVC: the farmer-roaster relationship and the roaster-retailer relationship. The farmer-
roaster relationship is quite clearly set by the FLO. The Fair Trade pricing controls what is paid and 
what premiums might apply. The relationship is stable, to a large extent outlined, and put in a stable 
framework. Therefore the interaction can be described as relational, as the roaster usually deals with 
a cooperative that obtains the coffee from farmers individually. Both companies are interested in a 
good relationship. This can, however, change as the Fair Trade GVC enters the mainstream market. 
The relationship between roasters and retailers, conversely, can be described as captive. A small 
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number of retailers are able to be the only outlets through which Fair Trade coffee reaches mass 
markets. The overall key player along this GVC is decidedly FLO International and, since 2004, 
FLO-CERT. FLO International has the power to decree what the different factors and 
characteristics that farmers and roasters have to apply to produce, process and sell under the Fair 
Trade Label. FLO-CERT certifies Fair Trade farmers and therefore it has the power to give out 
certification or not. This makes these two companies key players and gate keepers in the Fair Trade 
GVC. 
4.5. Prices and Value in Fair Trade GVC  
Prices in the Fair Trade GVC are set by the FLO and are paid to the farmers according to 
regulations. In the Fair Trade GVC the coffee farmers are central to the policies and the overall 
initiative. Therefore, the Fair Trade Minimum Price exists. The prices to be paid is non-negotiable: 
the Fair Trade Minimum Price or, if the market price rises above that the market price plus an 
additional Fair Trade Premium. Additional premiums can be awarded to the farmers if they apply 
and are able to get one. For Fair Trade farmers it is very common to have not only the Fair Trade 
certification but also organic certification, meaning extra premiums regulate the price for the green 
coffee bean as well. I only focus on Fair Trade prices in this thesis.  
 
 
Figure 11: Value captured by actors in the Fair Trade GVC  
(adopted from Nicholls & Opal 2005: 83; figure by author) 
In 2005 Nicholls and Opal studied the value captured by farmers in the Fair Trade GVC. Their 
results show that about 11.8 percent is captured by the farmers; while the cooperative of the small-
scale farmers captures about 5.7 percent. About 18 percent of the retail price is paid to farmers and 
their cooperatives. The remaining shares are distributed to roasters (38 percent) and retailers (30 
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percent). This calculation includes marketing and advertising, but not other costs, for example, 
transportation, though, this is only a very small percentage captured by logistical companies (ibid.: 
83).  
Kilian et al. (2006) highlighted in their study sustainable agriculture as a strategy to improve 
income for farmers and raise the prices paid to farmers, exporters, roasters and retailers for Fair 
Trade coffee in Europe. They suggest that about 18 percent goes to farmers, about 7 percent to the 
exporters, 35 percent to roasters, and the remaining 39 percent to retailers, though consumer taxes, 
transportation, etc. must still be subtracted. It is suggested that these factors add to about 9 percent 
(consumer tax in Germany is around seven percent for coffee), about 30 percent is captured by 
retailers (ibid.: 329).  
Supporting these studies in her dissertation Nina Langen (2012) lists prices for Fair Trade coffee in 
Germany and how much of the value is captured by farmers in producing countries. Her conclusion 
is that, on average, 16 percent in blends and 17 percent in single origin coffee is captured by coffee 
farmers in producing countries (ibid: 110). Thusly Nicholls and Opal’s presentation of the Fair 
Trade GVC remains largely the same. That farmers and cooperatives earning approximately 20 
percent of the retail value is also reflected by the other studies which were presented above.  
4.6. Part Conclusion  
In the Fair Trade GVC, producing countries capture value by participating in the Fair Trade system. 
Though they must satisfy the requirements established by FLO and FLO-CERT. Participating 
farmers and their cooperatives capture about 20 percent of the final retail value in the Fair Trade 
GVC. They can earn this percentage by upgrading, the handling of certain steps usually carried out 
by other actors such as processing and, by requirement, selling directly to importers in consuming 
countries. Through this upgrading process and subsequent shortening of the GVC actors in 
producing countries increase their earned value. However, the results have to be interpreted with 
care, as the main obstacle for farmers is the huge oversupply of Fair Trade coffee worldwide. This 
surplus leads to coffee produced under Fair Trade conditions being sold on the conventional market 
as no buyer for Fair Trade coffee can be found. Finally, actors in the producing country are still 
mainly ‘just’ green bean suppliers for bigger roasters and retailers in consuming countries. This 
limits the upgrading possibilities as the next steps include roasting or marketing and branding 
which entail very high barriers to entry. Nevertheless, the example of Direct Trade of Roasted 
Coffee will show that functional upgrading is not only possible but also economically achievable.  
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Chapter 5 | Direct Trade and Direct Trade of Roasted Coffee 
In the following chapter I present two more recent forms of coffee GVCs. These two forms are 
Direct Trade and Direct Trade of Roasted Coffee. Direct Trade of high quality or specialty coffee 
has experienced growth in the global coffee trade in the last decades. These forms of trade are 
relatively new to the coffee consumer. Direct Trade of Roasted Coffee is the newest of the 
presented trading forms. As the names suggest, both GVCs focus on the direct relationship between 
actors in consuming countries and the coffee farmers they purchase coffee beans from, though, the 
interpretation of ‘direct relationship’ can vary greatly among roasters. Another common ground of 
the two GVCs is their goal to provide only high quality products through small-scale roasters; 
attributes consumers value and pay higher prices for. The phenomena of Direct Trade has not been 
widely recognized by academia yet so considerable data comes from three interviewees with Direct 
Traders: Trez Cabezas (Germany), Just Coffee (Denmark), and Coffee Collective (Denmark). 
However, the focus of this thesis is Direct Trade of Roasted Coffee as an even newer, lesser well-
known phenomena. The only two companies engaging in Direct Trade of Roasted Coffee that the 
author is aware of have been interviewed for this thesis: Solino and Christof Feichtinger – Café de 
Guatemala, both located in Germany.   
I will show that not only is the GVC shortened in this form of trade but also that coffee experiences 
a certain de-commodification as more emphasis is laid on origin, taste, and in the case Direct Trade 
of Roasted Coffee, on functional upgrading in the producing country. Changing the position of 
farmers and actors from producing countries which effects the governance structure in these GVCs. 
This, however, complicates the finding of lead firms. Nevertheless, roasters for Direct Trade and 
distributors for Direct Trade of Roasted Coffee become outstanding companies along the GVCs by 
gaining the access to the consumption market, participating in marketing and branding of coffee and 
finally, initiating the presented GVCs. 
Following the GVC theory, these changes should be significantly noticeable in the proportions of 
value distributed between producing and consuming countries along the GVC. Actors in producing 
countries can affect their shares by increasing quality of their product in Direct Trade or 
functionally upgrading in Direct Trade of Roasted Coffee, effectively erecting and hiding behind 
barriers to entry. This should not only lead to changes in the governance structure but also enable 
the actors in producing countries to capture more value and should ultimately lead to higher and 
more stable income. Despite the change in how coffee is traded and what criteria is sought, the 
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overall distribution of value along the GVC remains largely the same in these forms of trade: 
roasters/distributors and retailers earn the largest shares of the GVC, generating the highest incomes 
in consuming countries.  Regardless of the effort and time actually contributed, about 70 (Direct 
Trade of Roasted Coffee) to 87 (Direct Trade) percent of the value is captured in consuming 
countries and the remaining 13 (Direct Trade) to 30 (Direct Trade of Roasted Coffee) percent is 
captured in producing countries. However, in the case of Direct Trade of Roasted Coffee a higher 
stability of incomes for actors in producing countries confirms the hypothesis that functional 
upgrading causes stabilization.   
5.1. Direct Trade 
As the form of Direct Trade has not been well recognized by academia, three companies were 
selected for an interview. Tres Cabezas is a small-scale roaster operating in Berlin, Germany, with a 
small café directly at the roasting site. It was founded by three friends (hence the name “three 
heads” in Spanish), each with some personal relation to Costa Rica and a desire to make a living 
with their passion for the country. As one of the founder´s partner had direct relations to coffee 
farmers, the idea of Direct Trade was born (Stock 2013). Just Coffee is located just outside of 
Roskilde, Denmark. Just Coffee is a small-scale roaster that established their links to producers via 
the Fair Trade network El Puente. Through this program they came to know farmer cooperatives 
and build up a direct relationship with them. This not only allowed Direct Trade of coffee but also 
minimizes the numbers of contributors to the value chain, a fact that Just Coffee’s CEO states is 
better for producers and consumers (Beckett 2013). The Coffee Collective has its headquarters in 
Copenhagen, Denmark, as well as their roasting site and an additional coffee shop. The company 
was founded by awarded baristas from Denmark and Sweden. They have a clear focus on the 
quality they want to provide to customers. They additionally state that they can guarantee a price at 
least 25 percent above Fair Trade price and that they have visited the producer within the last year 
(Dupont 20133).  
All of these three different companies can be considered Direct Traders as they have direct relations 
with the farmers they buy their coffee from, a key characteristic of Direct Trade. Additionally, they 
each emphasize on the high quality of their coffee, which they dub specialty coffee. In the Direct 
Trading system, roasters are small companies and not large international players that specialize in 
high quality coffee. These micro-roasters focus not only on specialty coffee but also on a primarily 
                                                          
3 Dupont, one of the CEOs of Coffee Collective in Copenhagen. 
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local market where they seek direct interaction with coffee consumers (Stock 20134; Dupont 2013). 
Additionally, “[s]pecialty roasting companies are forming campaign alliances with civil society 
organizations and producer cooperatives” (Bacon 2005: 507). The goal is consumer education, 
promotion of new strategies in coffee trading, and, of course, differentiation from ‘conventional’ 
coffee.  
In the high quality sector coffee are traded via auctions as well. These are rarely held by farmers 
and most often by third parties (e.g. Cup of Excellence) that go between farmers and roasters or 
international buyers (Wilson & Wilson 2014: 92). Detailed information about the coffee farm is 
provided to buyers (Donnet et al. 2007: 14), though the direct personal relation is missing. It is 
suggested that some price difference should be noticeable between this auction system and those 
Direct Traders with personal relationships to the farmers.  
One of the main arguments named in favor of the specialty coffee trade (auctions and Direct Trade) 
is that coffee farmers are better paid in absolute terms than in other trade forms. Through direct 
relationships farmers are not only able to participate in other forms of trade but are in a better 
position to capture higher prices. In both cases the biggest single characteristic that influences the 
price paid is quality (Donnet et al. 2008: 275; A.P. Wilson 2012: 26; Treuber & Herrmann 2012: 
737). Higher quality fetches higher prices for farmers as buyers, especially roasters, are willing to 
pay extra premiums for quality and taste (Bacon 2005: 500); emphasizing again the relation 
between quality and price that producers can receive if quality standards are met (Ruben & Zuniga 
2011: 100). Roasters know that they can sell the coffee to consumers at a higher price than in 
conventional trade. The possibility arises for producers to capture more value along the chain 
through a focus on quality, taste and origin (Donnet et al. 2008: 268). This primary focus on quality 
is the most recognizable characteristic of Direct Trade and the auction system, present as the 
overarching goal in no other trade form discussed in this thesis.   
5.1.1. GVC of Direct Trade 
In Direct Trade the value chain is shortened. With a maximum of 5 steps from farm to cup; (1) 
farmer; (2) processing; (3) transportation; (4) roaster; (5) café. From the farm the coffee either goes 
to a processing firm or sometimes is even directly processed at the farm (which only large farms are 
able to do). The coffee is then exported to roasters, who roast, grind and sell it, either in cafés or via 
                                                          
4 Stock, one of the CEOs of Tres Cabezas in Berlin. 
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the internet. Few micro-roasters sell their coffee via retailers (Beckett 20135). This shortening 
eliminates many middlemen in both producing and consuming countries. Not only does the coffee 
pass through fewer hands but fewer actors participate along the GVC. This means that actors in 
both producing and consuming countries are functionally upgrading as they take over new steps in 
the GVC: farmers process their beans and roasters trade and sell their coffee on their own behalf. 
Despite the shortening of the GVC the coffee is sold at premium prices in the consumption markets 
which leads to higher prices being paid along the whole value chain.   
The value captured varies according to the participant’s ability to hide behind barriers to entry. The 
greatest barrier to entry for farmers is the high quality sought by roasters. This quality is not easily 
achieved, contingent upon knowledge of how to grow and harvest high quality coffee quality 
(Bacon 2005: 503ff). The adoption of certain standards is required and specific production 
techniques is essential (Wollni & Zeller 2007: 6). Farmers must not only provide this kind of 
quality but also reach quality markets. With no additional cost to farmers, the Cup of Excellence 
provides an interesting opportunity though the farmers must learn the access and participation rules, 
for example, applying in time and handing in samples of coffee (Donett et al. 2008: 679f). This 
leads to the final barrier to entry. Farmers that produce beans of varying have to provide the 
logistics to sort and sell the beans according to quality which some small-holder farmers might not 
be able to (Feichtinger 20146).  
5.1.2. Governance 
The overall coffee GVC is buyer-driven as the roaster looks for certain quality and decides which 
beans would ‘fit’ the company and the taste of consumers. Additionally, coffee is an agricultural 
product which almost automatically results in a buyer-driven GVC. Though coffee experiences a 
certain de-commodification, it is still sold and drunk primarily in consumer countries supporting the 
analysis of the GVC as buyer-driven. However, the focus on quality led to the emergence of web-
based auctions for high quality coffee on the last decade (Donnet et al. 2010) which leads to a 
producer-driven value chain. Excepting this anomaly, the Direct Trade GVC remains buyer-driven.  
Analyzing the Direct Trade GVC is for the five ideal types of Gereffi et al. (2005), the structure can 
be described as relational if auctions are excluded, as both parties have interest in a long-term 
relationship (Lyon 2010: 125): Farmers are guaranteed a high price and roasters have a constant 
source of specialty coffee. Both parties are interested in a good and long-term cooperation, leading 
                                                          
5 Beckett is one of the CEOs of Just Coffee, Roskilde.   
6 Feichtinger is CEO of Cristof Feichtinger – Café de Guatemala, Germany.  
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to a relational governance structure. This analysis of the Direct Trade GVC should be supported by 
the prices and by its different shares of value captured. While coffee is de-commoditized to some 
extent, the majority of the value should still be captured in consuming countries, particularly by 
roasters who seem to have relatively more power in the GVC.  
5.1.3. Prices and Value in Direct Trade  
There are basically two ways of prices being set in the Direct Trade: (1) directly between buyer and 
seller; and (2) via auctions (Smith, 2010: 36). The first way underlines what the name already 
suggests: via direct relationships are not only contacts kept, but also coffee prices are agreed upon 
directly (via the phone, online, or in person). The important part here is that the price is agreed upon 
directly between the buyer and the seller. In the first way the numbers given by the interviewed 
companies are relied on. They either mentioned a minimum price of US$ 2.60 per pound (Beckett 
2013) or at least 25 percent above Fair Trade price (Dupont 2013). This would be a minimum price 
of US$ 1.75 (as the Fair Trade Minimum Price is set at US$ 1.40 for washed Arabica coffee). Here, 
a reasonable wide price range can be observed. However, it has to be noticed that the companies 
always refer to these prices as ‘minimum’ prices.  
In the second method buyers have to bid and will be able to buy the coffee they want if they 
proposed the highest bid. These prices are agreed on a third-party platform (e.g. Cup of Excellence). 
Due to the nature of auctions and/or personal agreements, prices can vary drastically. Below, I will 
show that the prices paid for high quality coffee is on average US$ 5.75 at an investigated auction. 
In general, it can be said that these specialty roasters are willing to pay producers price premiums 
for higher quality beans (Bacon 2005: 500, Smith 2010: 36). This is also supported by the findings 
of Wilson and Wilson (2014) who state that prices paid in the specialty coffee sector are on average 
4.5 times higher than the stock market price (ibid.: 92). This supports my findings of a certain de-
commoditization of coffee as an emphasis is laid on origin, taste and quality by the buyers. 
Therefore, farmers participating in the Direct Trade GVC are able to obtain higher prices for their 
coffee. This should lead to a higher share of value captured by the farmers. In the first case, a coffee 
auction is analyzed and the second, the data from the interviews is evaluated.  
I analyze one of the most recent coffee auctions with available data online: the coffee auction of 
Daterra Coffee, Brazil, on the 2nd of December 2014. In the auction bids are given via internet and 
the buyers include roasters all over the world. In total 38 different types of coffee were sold; 
however, three different companies are examined, as here retail prices could be viewed as well. 
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These companies are Kaffitár (IS), Horsham Coffee Roaster (UK), and Beanberry Coffee (UK). In 
total they purchased 6 different types of coffee for an average of US$ 5.75 per pound; ranging from 
US$ 4.50 up to 7.90 US$ per pound (Daterra Coffee 2014). Each of these were above stock market 
prices. On the other hand, these coffee companies sold the coffee on average for US$ 38.8 per 
pound; Kaffitár for US$ 20.4 (Kaffitar 2014), Horsham Coffee Roaster for US$ 39.2 (Horsham 
Coffee Roaster 2014), and Beanberry for US$ 47.80 (Beanberry Coffee 2014). Therefore, 15 
percent of the final retail price is captured by farmers in producing countries. These findings are 
supported by the work of Wollni and Zeller (2007) who also found that producers are able to 
receive increased prices when participating in specialty coffee marketing channels (ibid.: 11). 
In the case of Direct Trade Just Coffee, a minimum price of US$ 2.40 per pound is named. They 
sell their coffee at about US$ 20 per pound (Just Coffee 2014) to the final consumer. Here, coffee 
producers capture about 12 percent of the final retail value. Coffee Collective states a minimum 
price of US$ 1.75. The coffee is sold on average for US$ 32.8 (Coffee Collective 2014) per pound. 
This leads to about 5.3 percent of the final retail value captured by the producers. If the average of 
both of these Direct Traders is calculated, producers capture 9 percent of the final retail value in 
these two cases. However, one has to exercise caution as the interviews state that these are or would 
be the minimum prices they would pay to farmers.  
This leads to the conclusion that 15 percent of the final retail value is captured in the auction system 
with about 11.4 percent in the Direct Trade model. This leads to about 12 percent of the final retail 
value that is captured by actors in producing countries if both systems are combined. The remaining 
88 percent is captured in the consuming country. Nevertheless, the buyer (roaster) has to pay for 
transportation, taxes and marketing. Therefore, of course, the 88 percent is not captured by the 
roaster alone, but typically by all actors in the consuming countries like the roaster and retailer (if 
used). This supports the findings above: despite the changes in the governance structure, the 
majority of the value is captured in consuming countries.  
5.1.4. Part Conclusion for Direct Trade 
The main aspect of the specialty GVC is the focus on quality and to provide this quality to 
consumers. Through this coffee experiences a certain de-commodification which can be noticed in 
the prices paid along the GVC. Actors in producing countries, however, capture about 12 percent of 
the final retail value, while actors in consuming countries capture the remaining 88 percent of the 
value. This is the case as roasters, who are able to hide behind the barriers of marketing and 
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branding, are the only link between producers and consumers, and therefore hold a strong marketing 
position. This leads to the conclusion that the small-scale roasters are the key players in the 
specialty sector as they are able to brand and market their coffee. Farmers have almost no ability to 
upgrade and are still only the suppliers for the roasters who control the GVC, from the green bean 
to the consumer. My findings are supported by Neilson and Shonk (2014) who argue that through 
the specialty coffee sector roasters are able to capture even more value along the value chain while 
they are able to “assert greater influence over quality and origin; to improve long-term supply 
prospects; (…) to save costs” (ibid.: 275). 
5.2. Direct Trade of Roasted Coffee 
Below I present the GVC for Direct Trade of Roasted Coffee. In this GVC, coffee is not only 
harvested and processed in the producing country, but it is roasted there as well before being 
exported to consuming counties. In consuming countries, actors focus on distribution, marketing 
and branding of the roasted coffee.  Therefore I will refer to these actors as ‘distributors’ from here 
on. As Direct Trade of Roasted Coffee is a relatively new and rare phenomenon, I was able to 
interview only two companies: Solino and Christof Feichtinger – Café de Guatemala, both located 
in Germany. These two companies are the only ones that I have found that are currently taking part 
in this GVC of Direct Trade of Roasted Coffee.  
The idea for Solino emerged during a workshop that was given by its CEO, Felix Ahlers, and a 
friend in Ethiopia for the ‘Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit’ (Association for 
International Collaboration, Germany). The workshop addressed value addition in developing 
countries. The CEO was an outsider to the coffee industry and had no intentions of holding as many 
steps of the value chain as possible in Germany. After the workshop, he founded Solino and looked 
for partners in Ethiopia. Local roasters buy coffee at the coffee stock market in Ethiopia and process 
the coffee further, roasting, grinding, and packaging it. Solino is only responsible for distribution 
and the link to supermarket chains. The CEO, Ahlers, works for a bigger frozen food corporation in 
Germany, and only runs Solino on the side. While the CEO does not to make his living from coffee 
trading, he still wants to run his company economically. Though the company has been running for 
some time, the CEO is still the only employee in Germany. Interestingly the packaging for the 
coffee is produced in Ethiopia as well. (Ahlers 20147) 
                                                          
7 Ahlers is the CEO of Solino in Hamburg.  
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Christof Feichtinger – Café de Guatemala had a different start. The CEO, Christof Feichtinger, was 
born and raised in Guatemala, and has remained in contact with the land and its people. While 
writing his Diploma about small scale farmers, he established relations with FEDECOCAGUA 
R.L.8, the parent organization of 140 farmer cooperatives in Guatemala. He sources his coffee from 
the parent organization, but personally visits the farmers to learn about the coffee and the farmers 
who produced it. The coffee is bought from the parent organization, processed by roaster in 
Guatemala before being exported to Germany, where the CEO, the only full-time employee in the 
company, distributes it both through the internet, to some coffee shops and retailers as well. As a 
final step, he wants to be able to print the packages in Guatemala as well. He noted that he already 
has found a suitable printing company. (Feichtinger 2014) 
The two overall aims of both interviewed companies are, firstly, to sell high quality coffee and 
secondly, to promote value addition in producing countries on both ends of the GVC, meaning 
actors in producing countries and consumers (Ahlers 2014; Feichtinger 2014; Solino 2014). Here, a 
main aim not only lies in the different steps actors from producing countries are able to perform but 
also how the functional upgrading of actors can take form. Alongside both companies have a clear 
focus on high quality coffee distinguished by taste and origin. Here information is provided about 
the people behind the actors in the producing countries and (in the case of Christof Feichtinger - 
Café de Guatemala) very detailed information about the coffee farmers and the origin of the sold 
coffee can be given (Ahlers 2014; Feichtigner 2014; Christof Feichtinger – Café de Guatemala 
2014).  
5.2.1. GVC step by step 
The GVC consists of a maximum of 6 steps. These include the farm, processing plant, roasting 
company, transportation, distributer in the consuming country, retailer if used, and finally the 
consumer (Ahlers 2014). The important change in the Direct Trade of Roasted Coffee GVC is that 
the coffee is roasted in the country of origin and not in the consuming country anymore. Therefore, 
the actors in consuming countries responsible for distribution, marketing and branding is the 
distributor, as this is the main function of the company in the GVC (Feichtinger 2014). This is a 
chain in which the actors in the producing country were able to upgrade functionally and achieved 
both another source of income and the chance to deepen skills and knowledge on another step in the 
GVC. Following the theory, this should lead to a noticeable change in the governance structure, 
more value captured and a more stable income in producing countries.  
                                                          
8 Federation of Agricultural Producer-Cooperatives of Coffee in Guatemala R.L. 
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Below I will look at barriers to entry, as actors from producing countries in the Direct Trade of 
Roasted Coffee GVC were able to functionally upgrade. The focus on coffee farmers somewhat 
diminishes from the GVC, however a bigger focus is set on the overall value captured in the 
producing country. Farmers are only favored if they are able to provide high quality, and other 
actors from producing countries were able to enter new functions in the GVC. This should have 
given these actors certain barriers to hide behind, secure their amount of value captured and lead to 
more stable incomes in the end (Feichtinger 2014). As pointed out by the interviewees, the highest 
barrier to entry is farmers’ and roasters’ ability to meet the quality standards for consuming 
countries (Ahlers 2014). Here, actors from producing countries in the Direct Trade of Roasted 
Coffee GVC were already able to meet certain quality standards; setting the entrance barrier quite 
high for new actors to enter the GVC. 
5.2.2. Governance  
The overall chain is buyer-driven, though much emphasis is laid on the quality and the structure of 
the GVC. This is the case, while producers have some say in the outlines of trade of coffee as an 
agricultural product, they are dependent on the distributor for success in consuming countries, and 
the ability to participate in the GVC and to stay in the position held by each player. However, the 
‘buyer-drivenness’ of the chain is narrowed as coffee is not traded as green beans, but as a roasted, 
ready-to-consume product.  
This is also supported by Gereffi et al. (2005). The relation between distributor and roaster in the 
producing country is best described by the relational type. The relation between distributor and 
retailer can be termed captive, as the retailer is able to demand the margins they want as the 
bargaining favor is on the side of the retailer. These are the two main relations along the Direct 
Trade of Roasted Coffee GVC with the distributor in the middle of them. This means that 
distributors play an important role in the Direct Trade of Roasted Coffee GVC as they are the link 
between producing and consuming countries. Therefore, it is very interesting to see how prices are 
set, as the governance structure should have a big impact on the price setting between the different 
actors. This leads to more value captured in producing countries, but with the restrictions as the 
main actors along the chain remain in consuming countries. 
5.2.3. Prices and Value in the Direct Trade of Roasted Coffee 
Both Christof Feichtinger – Café de Guatemala and Solino claim a very transparent price policy 
which is communicated either directly to farmers (Feichtinger 2014) to the roasters where the coffee 
is bought from (both cases). Christof Feichtinger – Café de Guatemala has an agreed minimum 
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price of 2.80 US$ per pound, double of the current Fair Trade Minimum Price, while the price 
Solino pays to roasters is calculated according to a model following the Ethiopian Commodity 
Exchange which tends to follow the ‘C’ price in New York (Ahlers 2014; Feichtinger 2014). In 
both cases the model and prices are agreed on by the buyer and the seller directly. This transparency 
gives the actors in the producing countries more market and pricing knowledge. 
However, all of these initiatives are only reliable if the value captured in producing countries 
changes in favor of the actors in producing countries. Therefore, the value capturing process along 
the GVC or Direct Trade of Roasted coffee is shown, analyzed and debated below. During the 
interviews this topic was touched on, of course, as it is at the heart of the analysis. Solino Coffee 
provided quite detailed numbers of the value addition process which are presented in the following 
figure: 
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Value captured along the Direct Trade of Roasted Coffee GVC 
step in GVC 
 
costs in Euro per 250gr bag value added 
coffee farmers 0,82 11,90% 
roaster 
 
0,43 6,23% 
labeling and packing 0,40 5,80% 
overhead, repairs 0,17 2,50% 
Bank and Financing 0,13 1,90% 
Different (weight loss, etc.) 0,36 5,20% 
Costs leaving Ethiopia 2,31 33,50% 
    Transportation ETH - GER 0,27 3,90% 
German Coffee Tax 0,55 8% 
Storage cost in Germany 0,16 2,32% 
Testing, Marketing, Promotion 0,18 2,60% 
Costs leaving warehouse 
Germany 3,47 16,80% 
    Distributor margin 1,66* 24%* 
Transportation in GER . . 
Retailer margin 1.30* 19%* 
Consumer Tax of 7% 0,48 7% 
Consumer Price 6,90 49,70% 
Figure 12: Value captured along the Direct Trade of Roasted Coffee GVC ( 
Ahlers 2014; Solino 2014; figure by author) *own calculations 
33.5 percent of the value is captured in the producing country. This includes taxes and commissions 
as well as the price to farmers, the roasting process and packaging of the coffee. Another 16.8 
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percent is captured by transportation to Germany, storage costs and promoting and marketing. The 
final 49.7 percent is captured by transportation costs in Germany, retailer margin and distributor 
margin. The bulk of the value captured is in consuming countries where the distributor and the 
retailer are located. However, the numbers provided do not make the distinction clear between the 
value captured between distributor and retailer. Additionally, if the 49.7 percent of value captured is 
divided between the actors; the following numbers are obtained: 7 percent consumer tax, and about 
4 percent by transportation in Germany (if the same price of transportation from Ethiopia to 
Germany are applied). This leaves the margin of retailer and distributor at about 40 percent. Each 
has about 19 percent value captured if equally divided. However, following the numbers above, the 
two mentioned points of (1) storage cost in Germany and (2) testing, marketing and promotion are 
shares that are in the other GVCs in the shares of the roaster (Conventional Trade/ Fair Trade/ 
Direct Trade); giving the distributor a total share of about 25 percent.  
According to Mr. Feichtinger about 50 percent of the value of the coffee sold to consumers is 
captured by the producing country (interview 2014), where the coffee is harvested, processed, 
roasted and packaged and then sent to Europe. If this is compared with the statement of the 
minimum price (of 2.80 US$ per pound) above, this leads to the following calculation: his coffee 
are sold for EUR 14.90 (which are about 18.3 US$) per pound. This means, that the farmer, at the 
minimum price, would capture about 15.3 percent of the final retail value. More detailed numbers 
were not provided by Mr. Feichtinger. However, if the numbers provided by Solino for the different 
steps above are used for the further calculation, a better picture can be drawn. Roasting (6.23 
percent), labeling and packing (5.80 percent), overhead and repairs (2.50 percent) and other factors, 
such as weight loss, (5.20 percent) add to a total of 19.73 percent additionally captured in the 
country of origin besides farmers. These calculated numbers (19.73 and 15.3 percent) sum up to 35 
percent which is the estimated overall value is captured in the producing country for Christof 
Feichtinger – Café de Guatemala. This leads to the overall conclusion of value captured by actors in 
producing countries if both companies are combined. About 33 percent of the final retail value is in 
both cases, Solino and Christof Feichtinger – Café de Guatemala, captured by actors in producing 
countries.  
The key player along the GVC, then, are the distributors as they have the power of branding and 
marketing the coffee. The distributor is also able to negotiate not only with producers but with 
retailers as well. Nevertheless, the retailers seem to have a huge bargaining power against the 
distributors, which is also supported by the volume of coffee traded by the distributors. Following 
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this argumentation, the distributor cannot be considered a lead firm in the Direct Trade of Roasted 
Coffee GVC, they are under high pressure by retailers. Therefore, I term them ‘outstanding players’ 
especially since the GVC would not exist without them.  
5.2.4. Part Conclusion for Direct Trade of Roasted Coffee GVC 
As shown, the overall GVC structure remains the same to a certain extent, with the two single 
actors distributors and retailers capturing the biggest single shares of the final retail value. However, 
through the possibility of functional upgrading, companies in producing countries are able not only 
to gain another step in the coffee GVC, but also to change the governance structure. Through the 
new skills acquired they are able to hide behind barriers to entry. This leads to more value captured 
in the producing country, which leads to more stable incomes. This can be shown as the cases 
provide either more value captured in producing countries based on a minimum price in the case of 
Mr. Feichtinger or, as in the case of Solino, the calculation model provides the roaster in the 
producing country with an income that is stable despite the volatility of the coffee prices at the 
stock markets. 
About 33 percent of the overall retailer value is captured in producing countries. The Direct Trade 
of Roasted Coffee switches the focus away from farmers to a value adding process, where more 
steps of the GVC are done in producing countries which leads to more stable incomes in the 
producing countries. However, there are no opportunities for actors in producing countries to 
further upgrade in this GVC, as the next steps would be branding and marketing, which have very 
high barriers to entry and are controlled by the distributor. 
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Chapter 6 | Federación Nacional de Cafeteros de Colombia (FNC) and its 
brand ‘Juan Valdez’  
Colombia is one of the most important green coffee bean producers in the world, though it has been 
overtaken in terms of volume by Vietnam and, in the last decade, by Indonesia, and now ranks 
fourth in produced volume globally. Colombia is one of the main producers of high-quality Arabica 
coffee in the world (Rueda & Lambin 2013: 288). In this chapter I give a brief introduction to 
Colombian coffee history with a deeper analysis of the Federación Nacional de Cafeteros de 
Colombia9 (FNC), which plays a central role in the history of the Colombian coffee sector and its 
development. Within the structure of the FNC I focus on the Juan Valdez Coffee Shops that have 
been opened in the last decade all around the world and the GVC that emerges out of this 
development.  
I will show that the Colombian case with FNC and the ‘Juan Valdez’ brand is a GVC of a vertically 
integrated network of companies led by the FNC that operates close to 300 coffee retailing stores 
around the world and provides its revenues through the FNC to the Colombian coffee farmers. 
However, as I will show, this case is more of an exception than a pioneer among the coffee-
producing countries, as the FNC has operated successfully for almost 90 years and was able to 
adapt to new circumstances and global economic environments, such as the initiation and 
breakdown of the ICA and a liberalizing economic model in the coffee sector. One of the major 
reasons for the success of the FNC is that its members were consistently smallholders and its strong 
organizational structure enabled it to influence not only the Colombian government but also the 
entire Colombian coffee sector. In the end the FNC was enjoying the support of most coffee farmers 
in Colombia because it was able to distribute benefits among the farmers through collecting a coffee 
tax. Next to these two points, one major reason for success is the successful operation of public-
private partnership with strong links between the FNC and the Colombian government.   
In the end this example shows how a coffee-producing country was able to build up the globally 
recognized brands ‘100% Colombian Coffee’ and ‘Juan Valdez’ that enabled them to gain profits 
from marketing and branding. The last decade has also shown, the FNC, mainly through two 
companies, is able to operate a profitable global coffee shop chain that provides income to the FNC 
and to its projects of social programs and construction of roads and schools in the coffee-producing 
regions of Colombia.   
                                                          
9 National Federation of Coffee Growers in Colombia – or FNC 
58 
 
6.1. Brief Coffee History in Colombia 
In Colombia coffee about 95 percent of the coffee farmers grow coffee on less than five hectares 
(Sanz et al. 2012: 28) and about 50 percent on less than a hectare (Álvarez 2010: 98). In total there 
are about 500.000 coffee farmers in Colombia that contribute to the coffee trade (Rueda & Lambin 
2013: 290). Currently Colombia is the fourth biggest coffee producer by volume on the globe (TCC 
2014). 
In 1927 the FNC was founded as an organization through which small farmers sold their coffee 
(Adelman 1981: 458; Clarence-Smith & Topik 2003: 148). In the 1940s the FNC became a branch 
of the Colombian government, and so can be seen as almost a state in a state. The influences of the 
FNC managers over the state and vice a versa varied significantly over time (Clarence-Smith & 
Topik 2003: 406). Additionally, in the 1940s the National Fund for Coffee was found by which the 
FNC was able to buy most of the domestic coffee production and support the marketing of 
Colombian coffee abroad (Rettberg 2010: 114f). The FNC was legitimized to collect a coffee tax 
from farmers, which currently is US$ 0.06 cents per pound (Rueda & Lambin 2013: 290). During 
the 1950s and 1960s cooperatives were heavily promoted by the FNC as a means of outsourcing the 
work of the FNC to the individual cooperatives as fewer resources were available. This promotion 
reduced the operative costs of the FNC significantly (Cattolica 2014: 15ff). By 1957 Colombia has 
had developed a heavy dependency on coffee exports (Mares 1993: 458) and in 1963 coffee 
amounted to 87 percent of the total export earnings, leading to a high vulnerability and heavy 
dependency on coffee as a source of national income (Juárez 1993: 91). 
In the 1980s the Colombian economy was diversified to the point “that no single product 
represented more than 30 percent of foreign trade” (Juárez 1993: 67f), reducing this dependency 
and vulnerability. In the late 1980s and early 1990s the Colombian coffee sector underwent 
dramatic changes as described in the beginning of chapter 3 of this thesis: institutional changes 
were initiated that led to a transition from a protectionist to a more liberal economy. During the low 
prices between 1989 and 1993, the FNC used its reserves to subsidize farmers (Cattolica 2014: 16). 
With the ICA breakdown in 1989, the FNC experienced pressure from the small-holders which in 
1996 resulted to “debts of more than 100.000 small and medium-sized producers was partly 
forgiven” (Rettberg 2010: 119). However, due to these high expenses “the FNC [had] to sell off its 
interests in the Banco Cafetero” (Bair and Hough 2012: 359) which meant coffee farmers had to 
approach other financial institutions with higher interest rates.  
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Today there are about 40 coffee cooperatives in Colombia with about 500 purchasing points 
(Cattolica 2014: 15). Via these purchasing points coffee farmers have access to the purchasing 
system of the FNC with a regulated minimum price. This reduces the operational risk of farmers. 
Coffee is still one of the main export commodities for Colombia and the FNC was able to hold a 
position of national and international significance (Rettberg 2010: 112). An notable factor is that 
Colombia is the only producing country that still has an organization involved in the coffee sector, 
the FNC (Fold and Larsen 2008: 65). According to Rueda and Lambin (2013), it is obvious why the 
FNC is still important for the Colombian coffee market:  
“In 2012 there were 80 active exporters of Colombian coffee: the top 10 of which 
represented 71% of the total trade coming out of Colombia. FNC is the largest 
exporter with 26% of the total trade share, while five national companies represent 
24% of the market and four multinational trading firms make up 22% of the trade. 
The rest are smaller local and international companies.” (ibid.: 290) 
The logistics of coffee purchasing, transportation, export, quality controls and commercialization of 
Colombian coffee are done by Almacafé10, a company founded by the FNC in 1965 specifically to 
carry out the functions of coffee logistics and quality control (Castro Beltrán 2013: 1f) which is still 
currently operating. This structure helped farmers receive a better price for their green coffee beans 
as shown by Giovannucci et al. (2002) farmers in Colombia receive about 70 to 75 percent of the 
‘C’-stock market price, which is one of the highest rates in the world (ibid: 57). This can be mainly 
explained by the existence of the FNC. 
6.2. Federación Nacional de Cafeteros de Colombia (FNC)  
The FNC continues to be the largest exporter of Colombian coffee with around a 30 percent share 
of the total export market. The coffee prices are published daily by the FNC and sets the national 
minimum price paid in Colombia. The price closely follows the ‘C’ market in New York and is paid 
to the farmers, minus the cost of the transportation to one of the 500 purchasing points. 
Additionally, the FNC provides technical assistance, R&D, infrastructure development and other 
services. Therefore the FNC basically works along three pillars: (1) enhancing production, (2) 
quality control, and (3) producing individual coffee samples for clients (Rueda & Lambin 2013: 
290f). Furthermore, the FNC has built hundreds of clinics and hospitals, thousands of schools, and 
funded numerous road and infrastructure projects (Giovannucci 2002: 5)  
                                                          
10 Fully: Almacenes Generales de Depósito de Café S.A. (General Warehouse Stores of Coffee S.A.) 
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As Adelman (1981) describes, the FNC is in theory controlled by the coffee farmers (ibid: 457), 
though as smallholders are represented at national and international level by what he calls 
technocrats (ibid.: 460), they are not always adequately represented. Giovannucci et al. (2002) 
describe the FNC as Colombia´s primary policy tool to regulate the domestic coffee market and 
with the goal to provide stable prices to producers since it was founded (ibid.: 55). These arguments 
are also reflected by Álvarez (2010) who states, that 
“the Federation of Coffee Growers is at once an organization that is ‘closed and 
controlled from the above’ and a union with the broad participation of hundreds of 
thousands small producers. And although it seems to have operated to reproduce the 
privileges of a group of large producers and exporters involved in other activities, 
especially finance, it has also managed to consolidate Colombian coffee production 
internally and externally. Even in the midst of the crisis, coffee producers have 
benefited from stability and much higher prices for their harvest than under the 
hypothetical conditions of a completely open market.” (ibid.: 98) 
The structure of the FNC is divided into different committees at municipal, departmental and 
national levels. Additionally, the FNC is represented by the national executive committee and the 
yearly national coffee congress (Giovannucci et al. 2002: 54ff). Despite the aforementioned 
critiques and the large organizational structure, the study carried out by the Centro Nacional de 
Consultaría in 2006 found that “90 percent of growers felt that the FNC contributes to the national, 
industrial and grower´s development” (Serrano & Villegas 2007: 5).  
The FNC also created the ‘100% Colombian Coffee’ and ‘Juan Valdez’ brands with a view of 
quality control and the promotion and marketing of Colombian coffee (Fridell 2014: 45). In the last 
decade Juan Valdez Coffee Shops have been opened to close the gap between coffee producer and 
coffee consumers. The FNC does not participate directly in the consumer market, but has 
outsourced this task to PROCAFECOL (Promotora de Café Colombia11) which is a Colombian 
company mainly owned by the FNC (Rueda & Lambin 2013: 291).  
PROCAFECOL was founded in 2003 with the goal of bringing Colombian coffee directly to 
international consumers. In 2002, the first Juan Valdez Coffee Shops were opened in Colombia 
during a test phase before opening stores internationally later on. Interestingly, as PROCAFECOL 
is mainly owned by the FNC, “the revenues of the retailing business go to the Federation and 
                                                          
11 Promoter of Colombian Coffee 
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therefore to education, infrastructure, health, extension and sport programs for the benefit of the 
coffee growers in Colombia” (Molleda & Roberts 2008: 158). This statement is consolidated by as 
preferential shares of total 15.75 percent being offered at special conditions to the coffee farmers in 
2005 (Serrano & Villegas 2007: 7). Hereafter, FNC owned 84.46 percent of the shares and the 
remaining shares were either owned by farmers themselves or by the Fundación Manuel Mejía, a 
foundation created by the coffee sector to support coffee farmers. 
6.3. The Brand Juan Valdez and its GVC 
In the late 1950s, the fictional figure of Juan Valdez was created by the FNC to promote and 
accelerate consumption of Colombian coffee (Fridell 2014: 45). At the beginning of the 1980s, the 
promotion campaign expanded globally and in 1981 a logo was introduced showing Juan Valdez 
with his mule in front of Andean mountains (Molleda & Roberts 2008: 157). Rettberg (2010) 
describes the invented character of Juan Valdez as follows:  
“Juan Valdez, the friendly small-scale coffee grower, was rightly chosen by the 
Federation to epitomize and market internationally the image of widespread welfare, 
opportunity, and wholesomeness associated with the Colombian coffee economy.” 
(ibid: 115) 
Coffee producers via the FNC have invested about US$ 500 million in the advertising of Colombian 
coffee since 1959 which led Juan Valdez to be one of the most recognized advertisements 
(Giovannucci et al. 2002: 46f; Rettberg 2010: 128). Not only is Juan Valdez widely recognized but 
at the same time during the coffee crisis between 1998 and 2002 the Colombian coffee industry 
centered around “a nation building and global branding campaign on Juan Valdez” (Molleda & 
Roberts 2008: 161). The campaign basically tried to deliver the message of high quality and hand-
picked Colombian coffee by hundreds of Juan Valdezes all around the country (Molleda & Roberts 
2008: 168).  
With the re-focusing of the trademark ‘Juan Valdez’ and the opening of Juan Valdez Coffee Shops 
in Colombia and abroad the FNC via PROCAFECOL wanted to “increase coffee producers’ profits 
by incorporating direct sales into its commercial model” (Serrano & Villegas 2007: 2). Through the 
spread of shares, as explained before, the earnings of the ‘Juan Valdez’ brand are returned to the 
FNC and are invested in further promoting the brand and the development of Colombian coffee 
regions via the construction of roads, schools, housing and social programs (Serrano & Villegas 
2007: 11).  
62 
 
According to the International Vice President of Juan Valdez Coffee Shops Alejandra Londoño the 
company had a total of 270 shops operating around the world in the beginning of 2014. The 
majority of the shops are located in Colombia, but about 80 operate internationally in Aruba, Chile, 
South Korea, Ecuador, Spain, the United States, El Salvador, Mexico, Peru, Panama, Kuwait, 
Bolivia, and Malaysia (Coffee Talk 2014). If this is compared to numbers from 2008, a sharp 
increase in numbers of coffee shops can be noted: in 2008 100 shops in Colombia and 10 outside 
the country were reported (Álvarez 2010: 103), meaning that the Juan Valdez Coffee Shops grew by 
over 100 percent in the last four years. This leads to the conclusion that the shops are operating to a 
profit and have experienced a stable growth since the operational start of PROCAFECOL in 2003. 
This means in return higher profits for the companies involved and ultimately for the FNC which 
ideally distributes the generated profits to Colombian coffee farmers, its stakeholders, and reinvests 
profits into the further promotion of Colombian coffee through the brands and the shops it holds. 
In terms of GVC analysis, this means that the FNC is operating a vertically integrated network of 
companies that offer the logistics from ‘farm to cup’. The FNC founded different companies that 
take care of the different steps of the value chain: (1) the farmers themselves deliver the picked 
coffee beans to purchasing points throughout the country, (2) Almacafé takes care of the 
distribution, further processing and quality control. Almacafé also functions as the roasting facility 
for coffee destined for the Juan Valdez Coffee Shops (Serrano & Villegas 2007: 17). Hereafter, 
PROCAFECOL takes care of the distribution among its shops and the final step of preparing the 
coffee for the end-consumer. Instead of a single company, several companies that are largely owned 
by the FNC carry out the different steps, which keeps all the profits of the value chain within one 
corporate network. The FNC retains the profits which it then invests in its social programs and 
construction works for the coffee growers in Colombia.  
Looking at the power structure within the vertically integrated network of companies, one can see 
the FNC plays a fundamental role not only in holding the majority of the shares for all involved 
companies but also in the end, as a stakeholder, profiting from the operational win of all companies. 
The structuring of ‘outsourced’ or ‘privatized’ responsibilities of logistics and roasting to Almacafé 
and distribution and retailing to PROCAFECOL enables the different companies to manage their 
own responsibility while at the same time generating profit not only for themselves as companies 
but in the end for the FNC. From my point of view this company network seems to be one of the 
main drivers behind the constant growth of Juan Valdez Coffee Shops in the last years. This led to 
more direct retailing to consumers and with it a growth in demand of ‘their’ Colombian coffee. This 
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means that the FNC was not only able to functionally upgrade into the roasting business but also 
successfully enter final consumer markets. This ultimately led to a secure income not only for 
farmers but for all employees involved in logistics, roasting, and retailing throughout the whole 
value chain.  
6.4. Part Conclusion 
There are several perspectives represented by different authors as to why the Colombian coffee 
sector is so successful. Cattolica (2014) argues that especially the cooperatives made the success 
possible, Mares (1993) and Juárez (1993) point out the specific policies made by the government. 
However, the majority of authors (among others Rettberg 2010; Álvarez 2010; Rueda & Lambin 
2013) agree that the strong organizational character of the FNC made the crucial difference to other 
coffee-producing countries and organizations. I see a red-thread in the Colombian case via four core 
elements. The thread starts with the founding of the FNC and ends at the operation of over 300 
coffee retailing stores over the globe. A constant movement towards this outcome is visible. Maybe 
the officials of the FNC have not planned it all along this way, but in hindsight it almost seems like 
it all emerged naturally out of the system. 
Firstly, with the founding of the FNC, a strong coffee-grower federation was established which 
quickly earned responsibility from the government and therefore assumed some governmental tasks. 
The FNC became a quasi-governmental organization or as it was described above: ‘a state within a 
state’. The first milestone was achieved when the government allowed the FNC to collect the coffee 
tax on all coffee to fund its operations and tasks.  
Secondly, in the late 1950s the brands of ‘100% Colombian Coffee’ and ‘Juan Valdez’ were created 
with the aim of enhancing the recognition of Colombian coffee as one of the best in the world and 
to be able to sell more of the produced coffee an increasingly competitive international coffee 
market. Shortly afterwards, Almacafé was founded as a company responsible not only for coffee 
logistics but also for the quality control of purchased coffee. Taking over the operational tasks of 
logistics, even just nationally, was one of the first major steps in upgrading and improving the 
operational costs of the Colombian coffee sector as labor costs were higher than in other coffee-
producing countries like Brazil or Vietnam. The FNC lead the movement towards more quality 
control and improved economics of scale in order to have a competitive advantage over other 
countries.  
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Thirdly, there was only one major step left for the FNC to take over in the global coffee value 
chain: retailing. They started first to sell their coffee in Colombia, then Latin-America and finally to 
the US and other countries. However, here the aim was to internationalize the retailing business. 
Through the Juan Valdez Coffee Shops the FNC provides a GVC that stretches from ‘farm to cup’. 
This means that the FNC built upon their previously achieved goals of creating the two brands and a 
national successful operating logistic company to eventually operate their first retail stores. 
Arguably the coffee consumption in Colombia made stepping up the value chain and expand the 
retailing business easier.  
Fourthly, throughout the entire period the FNC was managed by a limited number of individuals. 
Schneider (2004) shows, that while the average presidential term of office rarely lasted over 4 
years, the average tenure for FNC was 15 years (ibid.: 137). This shows the strong constancy of 
operations of the FNC. Additionally, the managing members of FNC were engaged in different 
economic sectors in Colombia and were therefore mainly interested in commercialization of coffee 
rather than the production (ibid.: 138). Furthermore, for Schneider one of the core elements is the 
overlap of business leaders and top government officials (ibid.: 129).  
This leads me to conclude that two core elements for the success of the FNC were (1) the overlap of 
public and private staff in the FNC which led to strong public-private cooperation in the coffee 
sector and (2) the power allocated from the government to the FNC. Therefore, I conclude that Juan 
Valdez Coffee Shops are more of an exception than pioneers. This is the case as the structure under 
which the FNC operates is not easily replicable for other producing countries. However, others can 
aim for more public-private partnerships to support their coffee sector.  
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Chapter 7 | Discussion and Conclusion 
In Conventional Trade, the main aim of the key actors involved in the GVC are to provide a 
constant high volume of coffee to as many consumers as possible by using highly branded coffee 
labels. In Fair Trade the focus of the (key) actors is the livelihoods of the coffee growers. This is 
mainly attempted through the Fair Trade Minimum Price under which the price for green coffee 
beans never falls and the non-monetary support is passed on to farmers. In Direct Trade the overall 
focus is on high quality for specialty coffee. This includes not only taste, but also origin of the 
coffee. In Direct Trade of Roasted Coffee these attributes play a certain role as well (as in Direct 
Trade), however the focus is set more on the overall income of producing countries along the GVC 
of coffee. This leads to functional upgrading of actors in producing countries as they roast the 
coffee sold in consuming countries. In the case of Juan Valdez Coffee Shops, the focus is on 
establishing a GVC from ‘farm to cup’ led by actors from producing countries. Additionally, it 
combines a clear focus on the promotion of Colombian coffee as a high-quality product and the 
direct delivery to consumers.  
These aims also influence the governance structure outlined for the different GVCs in the thesis. A 
common finding for all GVCs was that the most important actors, or lead firms, are always based in 
consuming countries except for the Juan Valdez Case. This heavily influences the governance 
structure, but generally speaking, the value chains are basically shaped by these power structures. 
Conventional Trade is found to be captive in its governance structure as the key players are roasters 
who dominate the whole chain. Fair Trade, Direct Trade, and Direct Trade of Roasted Coffee are all 
shaped by a relational governance structure as the GVC is either heavily regulated by a third party, 
as with Fair Trade, or the actors have a strong interest in a good long-term relation as with Direct 
Trade and Direct Trade of Roasted Coffee. Juan Valdez Coffee Shops are based on several 
companies and organizations that have the shape of a vertically integrated network of companies. 
All of the participating companies are owned in their majority by the National Federation of Coffee 
Growers of Colombia. Therefore, the latter GVC is considered to be hierarchical in its governance 
structure.  
The governance structure is also influenced by the numbers of actors involved. If fewer steps are 
needed from farm to cup, a smaller amount of actors are involved. In Direct Trade and Direct Trade 
of Roasted Coffee, actors establish easier relational governance structures as they are more familiar 
with each except if coffee is traded via auctions. The different steps needed for coffee to reach 
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consumers are shown below. The blank spaces indicate actors which are not present in the chain 
and where another actor has taken over the usual entity’s tasks. The colors represent the actor’s 
location: lighter grey in consuming countries and darker grey in producing countries.  
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Figure 13: GVCs step by step (figure by author) 
As one can see the different value chains contain a changing numbers of actors involved from 
Conventional Trade (8) to Fair Trade (6) to Direct Trade (4) and Direct Trade of Roasted Coffee 
(5). The GVC for Juan Valdez Coffee shops includes 5 different actors carrying out all necessary 
steps. Nevertheless, all actions have to be carried out, from processing to exporting to roasting and 
retailing. However, different actors have taken over some steps and subsequently have upgraded. 
Therefore upgrading takes place in consuming and in producing countries throughout the GVCs of 
coffee.  
For Conventional Trade, 37.5 percent of all steps are carried out in a producing country. In Fair 
Trade about one third of all steps include producing countries, while Direct Trade has 25 percent of 
all steps in producing countries, and Direct Trade of Roasted Coffee 40 percent. The Juan Valdez 
Coffee Shops carry out 75 percent of their activities in producing countries independently, only 
consumption takes place in consuming country, which, of course, is impossible to relocate. Juan 
Valdez Coffee Shops maximize the number of steps taken in producing countries or owned by a 
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company from a producing country (retailer). This leads to the suggestion that this has a strong 
influence on the share of value captured in producing countries. 
The following graph shows the different percentages of value captured in producing and consuming 
countries. As suggested, the difference in steps taken in producing countries has a direct influence 
on the percentage of value of the final retail price captured by participants there.  
Value captured in 
GVCs 
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Figure 14: Value captured in GVCs (figure by author) 
Firstly, the presented shares are supported by the findings of Rueda and Lambin (2013) in 
Colombia. They found about the same shares of value captured for Conventional Trade (about 23 
percent) and Labeled Trade (Rainforest Alliance) (about 25 percent) but a much lower percentage in 
Direct Trade (about 6 percent). Secondly, my results support the theory of the Global Value Chain 
and its main assumptions: (1) via (functional) upgrading higher percentages of the final retail value 
can be captured, (2) this also influences the governance structure of the GVC, and (3) GVCs are 
malleable and can vary significantly over time.  
The figure above suggests that Fair Trade and Direct Trade do not support this finding and that the 
GVC theory as actors in producing countries capture less value although they are producing a 
differentiated product either by the label or by quality. Direct Trade promises high-quality coffee 
from a direct relationship with farmers. These goals are reached and the claims that farmers reach 
an overall better price can also be confirmed. With Direct Trade, coffee leaves the undifferentiated 
product market and enters the high-quality market of differentiated products. However, in both 
cases actors in producing countries basically stick to the function of green bean suppliers, whereas 
in Direct Trade of Roasted Coffee and in the Juan Valdez Coffee Shop GVC actors from producing 
countries were able to functionally upgrade into roasting and in the latter into marketing, branding 
and retailing. Therefore, the findings support the theory which states that especially functional 
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upgrading will lead to a higher percentage of value of the final retail price captured. However, the 
shares do not present the monetary output of participation in the different GVCs which is in both 
cases in absolute terms higher for farmers in Fair Trade and Direct Trade than in Conventional 
Trade.  
The percentages displayed above are only relate to monetary characteristics and therefore do not 
display other values or knowledge that are either passed ‘down’ the value chain or provided to 
actors along the value chain. This is especially noteworthy in the case of Fair Trade, as authors 
found that in this trading system is not only the Fair Trade Minimum Price is of interest for the 
farmers, but also the non-monetary values and knowledge transferred to farmers. Among others, 
Jaffee (2007) shows in his book Brewing Justice the non-monetary benefits of Fair Trade. These 
benefits are not included in the GVC analysis. Despite Fair Trade reaching the goal of giving a 
bigger share to the farmer by cutting out middlemen (Dragusanu et al. 2014: 223) and setting a 
minimum price, the overall support for the industry and the contribution to its development are 
somewhat limited as the coffee farmers are not able to leave the position of green bean suppliers. 
Bacon et al. (2014) even argue that the cost of Fair Trade exceed the monetary benefits, which leads 
to seasonal hunger in coffee farming regions. Here, Fair Trade could make an even bigger 
contribution by roasting their coffee in producing countries and then shipping it to consuming 
countries which constitutes Direct Trade of Roasted Coffee. 
All of these arguments show that GVCs are (re)shapeable. This indicates that the coffee GVC can 
be restructured in different ways and still operating in an economically profitable and sustainable 
way for all involved. The changes are not only seen in the number of actors or the main aims of the 
GVCs, but also in the governance structure, the steps taken in producing and consuming countries 
and finally, in the shares of value captured by different actors. Also actors are able to switch GVCs 
and take part in another structure. However, barriers to entry determine the difficulties of such 
moves. As the thesis shows they can vary strongly from actor to actor and from value chain to value 
chain. In general speaking, actors in consuming countries have an easier position to switch value 
chain as almost all GVCs are buyer-driven. Farmers or actors in producing countries encounter 
much higher barriers to entry as they either have to meet certain quality standards or label standards 
before they are able to participate in another GVC. All of these activities go hand in hand with high 
capital investment and risks. Nevertheless, as the Colombian case shows, different GVCs are 
possible.  
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The Colombian example shows that through a constant growth of capabilities led the FNC 
ultimately to operate a global coffee retailing system from ‘farm to cup’. This shows that it is 
possible for actors from producing countries to directly enter the consuming markets. There are two 
core elements for the FNC that made this constant movement from production of green beans, via 
logistics through Almacafé to retailing via PROCAFECOL possible: (1) strong links between 
private (the FNC) and public administrators and (2) the quasi-governmental position of the FNC. 
However, it has to be recognized that the FNC was able to maintain support from small-holders 
throughout the years and has successfully been operated close to 90 years. The integration of small-
holders was made possible via a strong organizational structure of the FNC and the constant spread 
of benefits to the small-holders via the construction of utilities and infrastructure such as schools, 
roads, and hospitals.    
This leads me to address the research question directly that coffee-producing countries have the 
capabilities of shifting their position from solely of green beans producers to more complex and 
powerful positions in the global coffee GVC. These possibilities of functional upgrading are 
especially notable when the different shares are compared; as demonstrated here, with Direct Trade 
of Roasted Coffee and the integrated company network of Juan Valdez Coffee Shops showing the 
opportunities for actors from coffee-producing countries. I conclude that there are currently two 
examples in the international coffee trade through which producing countries could improve the 
amount of value captured: Direct Trade of Roasted Coffee and Juan Valdez Coffee Shops. In both 
chains actors from producing countries were able to functionally upgrade and therefore improve 
their position in the chain, gaining more value and therefore a more stable overall income for ‘their’ 
coffee sector. The functional upgrading in the case of Direct Trade of Roasted Coffee shows that 
the share of value captured in producing countries can be raised by 50 percent as compared to 
Conventional Trade and Fair Trade and more than doubled if compared to Direct Trade.   
However, global coffee trade consists of 4 percent labeled coffee (Fair Trade, Organic, UTZ, 
Rainforest Alliance) (Kolk 2013: 329), 10 percent specialty coffee (Fischer & Bart 2014: 164), and 
about 86 percent conventionally traded coffee. This shows that the presented GVCs are mainly 
niche markets. Nevertheless, with the shift in consumer choice for more quality and with 
certification, these niche markets of today could become the leading markets of tomorrow. High-
quality markets already have the highest growth rate in today’s coffee sector (Fischer & Bart 2014: 
163). Producing countries should prepare to meet these demands of coffee markets.  
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Though Direct Trade of Roasted Coffee is more of a niche in a niche market, current data proves 
that this form of trade also works, with higher benefits for actors in coffee-producing countries, 
whereby they can leave the position of green bean suppliers and upgrade along the value chain. This 
form of trade could move from niche to mainstream if consumers are willing to buy this coffee. If 
demand rises, an overall growth is inevitable and would result in Direct Trade of Roasted Coffee 
leaving its niche market existence. It would be interesting to see if this coffee could attract more 
‘ethical’ consumers or would expand into the shares of other initiatives that lead in the same 
direction. Additionally, the barriers to entry are quite high as actors from producing countries need 
to fulfill the demands of consuming markets and consumers. The example shows that actors from 
producing countries are able to meet these demands and supply actors in consuming countries with 
roasted coffee. Here the most essential task is to establish a relationship with a firm in the 
consuming country that is willing to support the functional upgrading of actors from producing 
countries in the value chain. The development of the coffee sector in producing countries is less a 
matter of taste rather than a question of taking advantage of existing opportunities.   
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